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I. INTRODUCTION
The inherent drama of the scene has made it almost a clich6 of movies and
Assistant Professor of Law, Thurgood Marshall School of Law, Texas Southern Univer-
sity. A.B. 1987 Harvard University, J.D. 1997 UCLA School of Law. The author wishes to
thank Texas Southern University for the Summer 2001 research grant that made the larger
project, of which this Article is a part, possible. The author also wishes to thank David and
Carrie Goheen, whose French hospitality and international internet service allowed the author
to complete the research and writing of Part V without the distractions that might have existed
had she been able to communicate with any locals other than the driver of the bread truck.
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television: after the death of a wealthy family member, the group of greedy and
bereaved survivors gather in a lawyer's office for the climactic "reading of the
will," which inevitably contains the unexpected. In real life as well, the contents
of a will often contain both pleasant and unpleasant surprises for the decedent's
"nearest and dearest." Those who expect to inherit a great deal may receive little
or nothing. Sometimes, the disappointed parties believe that someone other than
the decedent is to blame for this unhappy turn of events. They want to sue
someone.
Historically, their only remedy was a will contest, known in some states
as a "caveat proceeding." A will contest, which usually takes place in a special-
ized state probate court, is an in rem proceeding against the estate of the dece-
dent.' Generally, the estate bears the cost of defending the proffered will. 2 In
theory, a will contest offers all interested parties the opportunity to determine
whether the document presented for probate is in fact the testator's last will (not
revoked, superseded, or procured by fraud or undue influence), and to establish
the disposition intended by the deceased. This process is attended with special
formalities and high standards of proof, intended primarily to protect the testa-
tor, who of course cannot testify personally (on account of being dead).
In some situations, however, a will contest will not work. To begin with,
if the intended beneficiary is not related to the testator or named in a prior in-
strument, he or she may lack standing to bring a will contest at all. For those
who have standing, even if the contest is successful and the will is not admitted
to probate, there is no guarantee that the testator's intended disposition will take
its place. The disappointed person may be unable to prove to the satisfaction of
the probate court that he or she is entitled to anything. In other cases, the dece-
dent may die intestate, having been prevented from making a will in favor of a
particular person, raising similar problems of proof.3 An expected inheritance
I See, e.g., Brissie v. Craig, 62 S.E.2d 330, 332 (N.C. 1950); accord Thigpen v. Walker, 37
So.2d 923, 927 (Ala. 1948) (Simpson, J., concurring); Andersen v. Barton Mem'l Hosp., Inc.,
212 Cal. Rptr. 626, 629 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985); Gardiner v. Goertner, 149 So. 186, 195 (Fla.
1933) (per curiam); In re Estate of Loesch, 481 N.E.2d 32, 35 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985); In re New-
man's Estate, 369 N.E.2d 427, 430 (Ind. App. 1977); In re Ditz' Estate, 125 N.W.2d 814, 818
(Iowa 1964); Hall v. Blackard, 182 S.W.2d 904, 906 (Ky. 1944); Bosworth v. Sewell, 918
S.W.2d 773,.777 (Mo. 1996); In re Carpenter's Will, 12 N.Y.S.2d 724, 728 (N.Y. Sur. Ct.
1939); Tooz v. Tooz, 50 N.W.2d 61, 64 (N.D. 1951); Maxey v. Mason, No. 89 CA 02, 1990
WL 105442, *4 (Ohio Ct. App. July 11, 1990); Mangold v. Neumann, 91 A.2d 904, 906 (Pa.
1952); In re Estate of Mills, No. E1999-01100-COA-R3CV, 2000 WL 337566, *2 (Tenn. Ct.
App. March 30, 2000); Taylor v. Dinsmore, 114 S.W.2d 269, 272 (Tex. Civ. App. 1938).
2 In some cases, the estate also pays the costs of certain good-faith challenges to the will.
Curtis E. Shirley, Tortious Interference With an Expectancy, 41 REs GESTAE, Oct. 1996, at 16
("Normally, the estate pays both defense attorney fees and those of a plaintiff making a good
faith attempt to probate a prior will.").
3 Because the tort covers situations in which the would-be testator was prevented from
making a will by the tortfeasor, it is an overstatement to say, as Shirley does, "The tort assumes
a confluence of an overt act by the testator and wrongful conduct by the defendant which pre-
cipitate change in an estate plan." Id. at 17. There may be no such overt act.
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may take the form of benefits under a revocable trust or other non-probate asset,
not covered by the will and hence not reachable by the probate court. The estate
may have been depleted through wrongfully-procured inter vivos transfers. As a
practical matter, disappointed heirs may settle for considerably less than they are
entitled to receive, in order to avoid dissipating the estate through a lengthy and
expensive will contest. In these and other situations, 4 a will contest simply does
not offer the disappointed person a way to obtain the intended legacy. As a re-
sult, more and more courts have recognized the need for a remedy outside the
probate process.
The tort of intentional interference with expectation of inheritance5 is
one such alternative remedy,6 recognized in some, but by no means all, of the
states. The tort first appeared in the Restatement of Torts in 1979, codified as
follows: "One who by fraud, duress or other tortious means intentionally pre-
vents another from receiving from a third person an inheritance or gift that he
would otherwise have received is subject to liability to the other for loss of the
inheritance or gift. '' 7 The most recent A.L.R. annotation on the subject identifies
the elements of the tort as "the existence of the expectancy; that the defendant
intentionally interfered with the expectancy; that the interference involved tor-
4 Some of these examples are drawn from Shirley, supra note 2, at 16, which contains other
examples as well.
5 Courts and commentators call the tort by a variety of names, as these article titles illus-
trate: Paul F. Driscoll, Tortious Interference With The Expectancy Of A Legacy: Harmon v.
Harmon, 32 ME. L. REV. 529 (1980); James A. Fassold, Tortious Interference With Expectancy
of Inheritance: New Tort, New Traps, 36 ARIz. ATr'Y, Jan. 2000, at 26; Marilyn Marmai, Tor-
tious Interference With Inheritance: Primary Remedy or Last Recourse, 5 CONN. PROB. L.J.
295 (1991); Dennis D. Reaves, Tortious Interference With An Expected Gift or Inheritance, 47
J. Mo. B. 563 (1991); Shirley, supra note 2, at 16. These are all treated as synonyms.
6 Possible remedies, depending somewhat upon the type of interference, are:
(1) the raising of a constructive trust; (2) resistance to or setting aside of
probate in the probate court; (3) setting aside of probate in equity; (4) a tort
action for wrong to the plaintiffs expectancy or some substantially equiva-
lent action at law or in equity.
Alvin Evans, Torts to Expectancies in Decedents' Estates, 93 U. PA. L. REV. 187, 187 (1944).
Although some courts evaluate the tort remedy in comparison to such remedies as an equitable
action for rescission or a constructive trust, among states in the Fourth Circuit, those that rec-
ognize the tort do not explore this alternative remedy. See infra Part II. However, the Maryland
courts, which do not recognize the tort, do endorse equitable remedies to the extent necessary to
carry out the will of the testator. Geduldig v. Posner, 743 A.2d 247, 256-57 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.
1999) ("Traditionally, claims attacking the distribution of estate and trust assets based on undue
influence and fraud were equitable actions. Equity courts could award pecuniary relief if neces-
sary to accomplish complete relief (e.g., when dissipation of assets prevented the traditional
equitable remedy). But these decisions were in the context of traditional equitable remedies
such as rescission, specific performance, injunctive relief, constructive trusts, and the like ....
In actions to set aside wills or trusts, equity focused on rectifying a situation wherein the testa-
tor or the settlor was not able to dispose of his or her estate freely .... The correction of that
harm was a result of righting the wrong to the testator or settlor.").
7 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 774B (1977).
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tious conduct such as fraud, duress, or undue influence; that there was a reason-
able certainty that the plaintiff would have received the expectancy but for the
defendant's interference; and damages.',
8
At least one appellate court in each of the states in the Fourth Circuit -
Maryland, North Carolina, South Carolina, West Virginia, and Virginia - has
addressed the question of whether to recognize the tort of intentional interfer-
ence with expectation of inheritance, with widely differing results.9 Although
8 Sonja Soehnel, Annotation, Liability in Damages For Interference With Expected Inheri-
tance or Gift, 22 A.L.R. 4TH 1229 (1983). See also Fassold, supra note 5, at 27 (citing two
Illinois cases). A Missouri-specific discussion of the tort and its elements can be found in
Reaves, supra note 5.
9 See infra Parts III and IV. Although a detailed survey of all fifty states is beyond the
scope of this Article, nearly half the states recognize it, while a third have no reported cases
addressing it. The Fourth Circuit is unusual in that all of its states have reported opinions. The
remaining ten states have either explicitly declined to recognize the tort, or have declined to
decide whether to recognize it. It should be noted that it is not always entirely clear whether a
state has recognized the tort. In some states, the court speaks approvingly of the tort in general,
but declines to allow the plaintiff to proceed on the particular facts or allegations of the instant
case. The tort is currently recognized in twenty-four states: Arkansas (Anderson v. First Nat'l
Bank of Hot Springs, 801 S.W.2d 273 (Ark.1990)); California (In re Estate of Legeas, 258
Cal.Rptr. 858 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989)); Colorado (Peffer v. Bennett, 523 F.2d 1323 (10th Cir.
1975) (no state courts in Colorado have yet recognized the tort)); Connecticut (Benedict v.
Smith, 376 A.2d 774 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1977); Florida (DeWitt v. Duce, 408 So.2d 216 (Ha.
1981); Georgia (Mitchell v. Langley, 96 S.E. 430 (Ga. 1918)); Illinois (Robinson v. First State
Bank of Monticello, 454 N.E.2d 288 (Ill. 1983)); Indiana (Minton v. Sackett, 671 N.E.2d 160
(Ind. Ct. App. 1996)); Iowa (Huffey v. Lea, 491 N.W.2d 518 (Iowa 1992)); Kansas (Axe, v.
Wilson, 96 P.2d 880 (Kan. 1939)); Kentucky (Allen v. Lovell's Adm'x, 197 S.W.2d 424 (Ky.
1946)); Louisiana (McGregor v. McGregor, 101 F. Supp. 848 (D. Colo. 1951), aff'd, 201 F.2d
528 (10th Cir. 1953) (although this case is sometimes cited in support of Colorado's recogni-
tion of the tort, the appellate opinion makes clear that Louisiana law of wills is being applied));
Maine (Cyr v. Cote, 396 A.2d 1013 (Me. 1979)); Massachusetts (Monach v. Koslowski, 78
N.E.2d 4 (Mass. 1948)); Michigan (Creek v. Laski, 227 N.W. 817 (Mich. 1929)); Missouri
(Hammons v. Eisert, 745 S.W.2d 253 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988)); New Jersey (Casternovia v. Cast-
ernovia, 197 A.2d 406 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1964)); New Mexico (Doughty v. Morris, 871
P.2d 380 (N.M. Ct. App. 1994)); North Carolina (Dulin v. Bailey, 90 S.E. 689 (N.C. 1916));
Ohio (Firestone v. Galbreath, 616 N.E.2d 202 (Ohio 1993)); Oregon (Allen v. Hall, 974 P.2d
199 (Or. 1999)); Texas (King v. Acker, 725 S.W.2d 750 (Tex. App. 1987)); West Virginia
(Barone v. Barone, 294 S.E.2d 260 (W. Va. 1982)); and Wisconsin (Wickert v. Burggraf, 570
N.W.2d 889 (Wis. Ct. App. 1997)). The following ten states have reported cases at the state
supreme court or appellate level addressing the tort and either declining to recognize it or de-
clining to determine whether it is recognized: Alabama (Ex parte Batchelor, No. 1991507, 2001
WL 527847, *4 (Ala. May 18, 2001) (per curiam) (this opinion clarifies that Holt v. First Na-
tional Bank of Mobile, 418 So.2d 77 (Ala. 1982), although sometimes cited in support of Ala-
bama's recognition of the tort, see, e.g., Fassold, supra note 5, should not be so read); Delaware
(Chambers v. Kane, 437 A.2d 163 (Del. 1981)); Maryland (Geduldig, 743 A.2d 247); Minne-
sota (Johnson v. Johnson, No. C6-00-1075, 2000 WL 1847587 (Minn. Ct. App. Dec. 19,
2000)); Montana (Hauck v. Seright, 964 P.2d 749 (Mont. 1998)); New York (Vogt v. Wit-
meyer, 665 N.E.2d 189 (N.Y. 1996)); Oklahoma (In re Estate of Estes v. Kramer, 983 P.2d 438
(Okla. 1999)); South Carolina (Douglass v. Boyce, 542 S.E.2d 715 (S.C. 2001)), Tennessee
(Fell v. Rambo, 36 S.W.3d 837 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000)); and Virginia (Economopoulos v. Ko-
laitis, 528 S.E.2d 714 (Va. 2000)). A Washington case mentions the tort, without making clear
whether it is recognized or not. Hadley v. Cowan, 804 P.2d 1271, 1275 (Wash. Ct. App. 1991)
[Vol. 104
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North Carolina was one of the first states in the United States to recognize this
tort, West Virginia is the only other state in the Fourth Circuit to recognize the
tort. The Maryland Court of Appeals, Maryland's highest court, had not ad-
dressed the tort as of 1999, the year of the most recent reported case in which an
intermediate appellate court declined to recognize it. A 1999 decision of a South
Carolina intermediate appellate court declining to recognize the tort was af-
firmed by the South Carolina Supreme Court in 2001. In 2000, the Virginia Su-
preme Court explicitly declined to recognize it.
Part II of this Article situates this up-and-coming tort theoretically, in
the interstices - one author calls it a "twilight zone"' 0 - between probate and tort
law. Part II describes the legal history and current status of the tort in the two
Fourth Circuit states that recognize it (North Carolina and West Virginia), and
provides an analysis of the elements of the tort in each state. Part TV reviews the
state of the law in the remaining three states of the Fourth Circuit that do not
recognize the tort (Maryland, South Carolina, and Virginia).
Part V changes gears somewhat, to examine a very significant proce-
dural/choice of forum issue, namely, whether the tort claim can be brought in
federal court under diversity jurisdiction, or is barred by the "probate excep-
tion." The Fourth Circuit has a well-developed jurisprudence on the probate
exception, although no cases specifically address whether the tort falls into or
outside of it. However, the Fourth Circuit applies a uniform method for deter-
mining whether a claim falls outside the probate exception, and this method is
so closely related to the method used by state courts in deciding whether to rec-
ognize the tort itself that a close reading of the probate exception cases offers
not only procedural guidance in the states that recognize the tort but also a fruit-
ful basis for speculation about recognition of the tort in the states that have not
yet done so.
II. A DESCRIPTION OF THE TORT AND ITS RATIONALE
Unlike the tort system, which addresses the injuries suffered by living
persons, the probate regime quite naturally focuses on the rights of the testator
(plaintiffs "claim that the probate court could not have considered actions in tort, such as
interference with the parent/child relationship, or the tort of interference with a parent's
testamentary gifts. This is not the law in Washington, however. We hold that although the
probate action was ostensibly in rem, it may have res judicata effect in a later in personam tort
action" (first emphasis added)). The remaining sixteen states (Alaska, Arizona, Hawaii, Idaho,
Mississippi, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, North Dakota, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island,
South Dakota, Utah, Vermont, Washington, and Wyoming) have no reported cases addressing
or even mentioning the tort.
10 Evans, supra note 6.
11 Even a cause of action for "wrongful death" is brought by survivors legally damaged by
the death, and/or the estate, which sues for the benefit of the heirs. Hence, for example, dam-
ages recoverable under a state's wrongful death law on account of a decedent's death (which
include nothing for the pain, suffering, or expenses of the decedent during his lifetime) are not
includible in his estate as property owned at death. Connecticut Bank & Trust Co. v. United
2002]
5
Klein: Revenge of the Disappointed Heir: Tortious Interference with Expe
Published by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2002
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
(or intestate decedent, or donor inter vivos) to make the disposition he or she
desires. The right to alienate property freely, in life and at death (freedom of
testation) is a cornerstone of the American property regime, even more so than
of the British system from which it derives. One way this is reflected is that tes-
tators have a right to completely disinherit nearly anyone, 12 and there is no
"right to inherit."'
' 3
Naturally, this focus on the property owner's rights does not mean that
the probate system turns a blind eye to misconduct relating to testamentary gifts.
Tortious conduct, such as the use of undue influence, threats, or coercion to pro-
cure a particular disposition, is understood as a legal wrong, but only against the
testator whose right of free testation is infringed upon, not the beneficiary. Be-
cause there is no right to inherit, any purported injury to the intended recipient is
not cognizable. Nor, on this approach, need it be, for the probate system through
the will contest or caveat proceeding offers all interested parties a forum in
which to litigate the testator's true intentions.
As the A.L.R. enumeration of the tort elements should at least suggest,
the wrongful conduct addressed by the tort of intentional interference with ex-
pectation of inheritance nearly always includes at least a wrong committed
against the testator (and not just against a beneficiary). Someone's tortious inter-
ference with another's inheritance generally involves influencing the testator
improperly (for example, by threats or trickery), or acting improperly with re-
gard to the testator's will (for example, changing it, destroying it, or preventing
its proper execution). However, although an injury to the testator is a natural
concomitant to the tort, the tort is not a remedy for testators (or their estates). As
the Restatement illustrates, the tort represents a fundamental and significant
shift of focus away from the testator and onto the wronged would-be benefici-
ary. Although a will contest centers on what the testator intended, the tort also
States, 465 F.2d 760 (2d Cir. 1972); Lang v. United States, 356 F. Supp. 546 (D. Iowa 1973);
Vanek v. United States, No. 73-1-D, 1973 WL 661 (D. Iowa May 21, 1973); Maxwell Trust v.
Comm'r, 58 T.C. 444 (1972); Rev. Rul. 54-19, 1954-1 CB 179; Rev. Rul. 75-126, 1975-1 CB
296; Rev. Rul. 75-127, 1975-1 CB 297.
12 "In all states except Louisiana, a child or other descendant has no statutory protection
against disinheritance by a parent. There is no requirement that a testator leave any property to
a child, not even the proverbial one dollar." JESSE DUKEMINIER, WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES
536 (6th ed. 2000). Spousal elective and forced-share statutes limit this freedom to some extent.
"Almost all of the separate property states [provide protection against disinheritance to surviv-
ing spouses] by giving the surviving spouse, by statute, an elective (or forced) share in the
estate of the deceased spouse." Id. at 472. In community property states, although the surviving
spouse receives half of what was formerly community property, the decedent is free to leave
half the community property as he or she wishes.
13 See, e.g., Bemis v. Waters, 170 S.E. 475, 476 (S.C. 1933) ("During the lifetime of an
ancestor, there are no heirs and certainly no vested right to inherit from such ancestor. There
frequently is an 'expectant interest.' But the voluntary act of the ancestor, done in a perfectly
legal way, frequently renders this expectancy a mere delusion .... The right to inherit, during
the life of an ancestor, does not exist.").
[Vol. 104
6
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 104, Iss. 2 [2002], Art. 4
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol104/iss2/4
REVENGE OF THE DISAPPOINTED HEIR
looks to the tortfeasor's intent.' 4 It highlights - and seeks to prevent or correct -
the wrongful conduct of the tortfeasor vis-at-vis a beneficiary, not the testator.
But the differences between a will contest and the tort go well beyond
such abstractions of "focus." As an action at law, compensatory and punitive 5
damages are recoverable by a person tortiously injured by a third party's inter-
ference with his or her expected inheritance.' 6 As a legal claim in personam
against the interfering tortfeasor, the costs of prosecuting and defending the ac-
tion - and paying a judgment, if the action is successful - are borne by the par-
ties, not the estate. In contrast to a will contest or probate claim, the tort defen-
dant must answer.' 7 In addition, prejudgment interest, attorney's fees, and puni-
tive damages beyond the lost legacy are potentially recoverable.' 8 Importantly, a
jury is also available.' 9 In at least some states, a federal forum may also be em-
14 Some commentators go too far in de-emphasizing the continuing role of the testator's
intent. For instance, one commentator has stated,
In contrast to a will contest based on undue influence, where the contestant
must establish that the free will of the testator was overborne, a tortious in-
terference claim does not require such a proof. Rather, the focus is on the
defendant's intention: whether the defendant intended to interfere with an
inheritance and acted on that intention.
Fassold, supra note 5, at 27.(citing Shirley, supra note 2, at 18). Another has stated,
In a will contest, the plaintiff alleging undue influence must show that the
decedent's free agency was destroyed and the decedent was constrained to
do what was against his will, being unable to refuse or too weak to resist.
The tort, however, does not require such proof. The law focuses on the de-
fendant's intent to cause the disinheritance, not on the effect of that intent
on the decedent.
Shirley, supra note 2, at 18. These statements go too far. First, if the form of tortious interfer-
ence is undue influence, the ordinary elements of that claim apply. In addition, one crucial
determination in the tort claim is whether the testator intended to leave anything to the plaintiff.
Finally, if the tortfeasor's intent had no effect on the decedent, there will be no tort. Hence, the
tort adds an additional question of intent; it does not replace one with another.
15 For the general availability of punitive damages, see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §
774B, cmt. e (1979). See also Fassold, supra note 5, at 28; Reaves, supra note 5, at note 20.
16 The precise measure of damages (as opposed to identification of the types of damages
available) is another matter. For a useful discussion of the measure of damages for this tort
under Maine law, see Driscoll, supra note 5, at 540-42.
17 See, e.g., IND. CODE § 29-1-7-17 (1997).
18 Fassold, supra note 5 ("Moreover, [the tort] permits the recovery of punitive damages and
attorney's fees, which a will contest normally does not."); Reaves, supra note 5, at 565;
Shirley, supra note 2, at 16 ("In the tort litigation [the tortfeasor] would have to pay his own
attorney fees and face the possibility of compensatory and punitive damages.").
19 Shirley, supra note 2, at 20 ("Almost all cases throughout the country have allowed a jury
in the tort action; however, cogent arguments against a jury demand may be raised if the case
involves a trust, equitable remedies such as restitution, or a constructive trust over the assets.").
20021
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ployed.2° In all, the tort's substantive and procedural tools for obtaining bequests
for would-be beneficiaries and punishing wrongdoers make it "a powerful
weapon" in the arsenal of the disappointed heir.2'
Of course, what a common law tort claim offers the successful plaintiff
- punitive damages, attorney's fees, and a judgment in personam against the
tortfeasor - may seem out of place when we think of the goal of the probate
system as ensuring that estates are distributed in accordance with the wishes of
the decedent. The testator-centered analysis is correct, as far as it goes - the
probate court recognizes the wrongs of unduly influencing testators and destroy-
ing wills, and it would seem, in principle, that the executor (or personal repre-
sentative) of an estate could be required to prosecute in probate court any claim
required to ensure that the testator's true wishes are carried out. The problem
arises when we consider facts outside what the probate system can accommo-
date.
Consider one typical tort fact pattern, the testator-parent and a group of
four siblings. Assume the parent's wish is to divide the estate equally among the
children, but one child tortiously induces the parent to make a will much more
favorable to him. Perhaps this will also names the tortfeasor as executor. Should
the other siblings bring a will contest, the estate will pay the costs of defending
the will, and we can assume the tortfeasor will defend the will vigorously.
Should the siblings succeed in their contest, and strike down the will, the tort-
feasor will still collect his one-fourth share by intestacy or a prior will - the
same inheritance he would have received had he never committed the tort (albeit
reduced by one-fourth of the costs of the defense, if he, as executor, elects to
mount one). The probate system thus offers no deterrent at all to the tortious
conduct just described.22
Consider another common fact pattern, the testator who wishes to make
a bequest to an unrelated companion who is not the parent of the testator' s adult
children, or to an entity like a foundation. A family member's tortious conduct
(such as destruction of a will or prevention of its execution) prevents it. In many
cases, the intended beneficiary, as neither an intestate heir nor a taker under a
prior will, will lack standing to bring a will contest at all. In other cases, even if
the beneficiary has standing, it may be impossible to prove up the gift. The tes-
20 Whether the plaintiff may file in federal court (or the defendant may remove, pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1441) depends on whether the requirements for diversity jurisdiction are met, pur-
suant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a), and also whether the "probate exception" to diversity jurisdiction
applies. The contours of the "probate exception" in each state of the Fourth Circuit are dis-
cussed in Part V, infra.
21 Shirley, supra note 2, at 20.
22 Fassold has described a similar situation - somewhat misleadingly - as "the perfect
crime." Fassold, supra note 5, at 26 (the tortfeasor "has virtually nothing to lose .... [if the
wrongfully-procured will is set aside] he is right back where he started, with no penalty paid for
his conduct . . . . And regardless of the outcome, [the] estate pays for [the wrongdoer's] law-
yers"). The same situation results if the tortfeasor outright forges a will, and ultimately does not
succeed in having it admitted to probate.
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tator, of course, is unable to testify, and the contestant's own testimony alone is
typically insufficient in probate court. If the will contest succeeds, the tortfeasor
may actually receive a larger share of the estate, depending on how intestacy
compares to the proffered will.
23
Examples like these (and others24) demonstrate that there are situations
in which the probate court is unable fully to correct certain wrongful attempts to
frustrate a testator's desires. Hence, even in its own testator-centered terms, the
probate system sometimes falls short, creating an opportunity for an extra-
probate remedy. 25 Because the standard of proof required to prevail in an ordi-
nary civil action is so much less than what is required to establish a bequest in
probate court, it is natural to look to the general civil court for that remedy.
Equity is the more traditional option, with its access to remedies such as
the constructive trust, which allows a court to ensure that the property ends up in
the proper hands without explicitly disturbing the probate decree. However, in
our legal culture, the tort regime has become the central locale for punishing
civil wrongs. With the merger of law and equity, a range of remedies is avail-
able to a victorious tort plaintiff. Moreover, in a legal climate that emphasizes
the deterrent effects of the tort regime, a tort approach may appear clearly pref-
erable to a probate system obviously unable to deter certain kinds of wrongful
23 For example, the intended disposition might be seventy-five percent to mistress, fifteen
percent to adult child A, and ten percent to adult child B, the tortfeasor. The disposition by will
is sixty percent to child A, forty percent to child B. Under intestacy, the division is fifty percent
to child A, fifty percent to child B. If the mistress successfully contests the will but cannot
establish the intended disposition, B "wins."
24 A tortfeasor might use undue influence to induce a testator to replace the name of one
beneficiary with that of the tortfeasor in a will. Although the court could refuse probate of that
part of the will, "that would not avail the plaintiff [the former beneficiary] in any way." Evans,
supra note 6, at 194. However, as Evans remarks, "Hence, it would be better to probate the will
as an entirety and have the defendant declared a trustee. This would probably be a more ade-
quate remedy than a tort action would be, but the latter action should be available." Id. Pre-
sumably, Evans comes to this conclusion on the basis of problems of proof the plaintiff might
encounter in setting up the original bequest.
25 Evans, an early commentator and advocate of the tort remedy, is especially vigorous in
his advocacy of the tort in the destroyed evidence problem of proof cases.
Where the will has been suppressed or destroyed, it may be probated, if the
evidence was not destroyed. This leaves the question still open for an action
in tort if the plaintiff should fail in the probate court because of the destruc-
tion of evidence by the defendant .... Probate may be impossible because
the defendant has deprived the plaintiff of the proof required to establish a
will. This is a wrong involving the plaintiff's loss of evidence and a tort
remedy should be available. This remedy constitutes no attack upon the
probate decree. An essentially different cause of action is stated in the com-
plaint .... [W]hile the plaintiff cannot have probate in equity [i.e., have the
equity court set up the will], it does not follow that he could not have an ac-
tion in tort because of his loss of evidence, which loss made probate impos-
sible.
Evans, supra note 6, at 202-04.
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conduct.
However, the tort has a further conceptual obstacle to overcome. Before
the tort can serve as a legal method for deterring and punishing wrongful inter-
ference with testamentary and inter vivos gifts, courts must come to terms with
the inherently speculative and uncertain interest the tort plaintiff possesses. If
there is no right to inherit, and a competent testator is free at any time to alter a
disposition, it is not clear what right the plaintiff has.26 Even without the inter-
ference, the tort plaintiff might never have been given anything. Some courts
have avoided this problem by rejecting the action on the basis that an intended
legatee has no legally-protectable right, but only a "mere expectancy. 27
For advocates of the tort, what is called for instead is the same shift in
focus identified above. The tort is not the right to inherit by another name. What
the tort protects is the right not to be interfered with in receiving an inheri-
tance. 28 Like a river, the flow of the testator's generosity might have changed
course and left the would-be beneficiary high and dry. But this does not give a
third party the right to divert it toward himself. Seen this way, so far from un-
dermining the right of free testation (a power of the donor vis-a'-vis any donee),
the tort protects the exercise of that right from wrongful third-party interference.
From this point of view, the tort actually enhances and secures freedom of testa-
tion (and inter vivos donation).
In addition, although it is well established that in general no one has a
right to inherit, our legal culture is becoming more and more comfortable with
the idea of legally-protectable expectancies in some circumstances. 9 In fact, the
26 For a helpful discussion of this issue, see Driscoll, supra note 5, at 533-36.
27 See, e.g., Cunningham v. Edward, 3 N.E.2d 58 (Ohio Ct. App. 1936). Evans describes the
Cunningham court as holding that "[tlhe plaintiff's prospect was held not to be of such legal
importance as to warrant the protection of it, inasmuch as he had no vested interest in the dece-
dent's property." Evans, supra note 6, at 192. The New York court took a similar position in
Hutchins v. Hutchins, 7 Hill 104 (N.Y. 1845). Connecticut reached a similar result in an inter
vivos conveyance case, see Hall v. Hall, 100 A. 441 (Conn. 1917). As Evans summarized, "The
court held that the plaintiff's expectation was not a legal property interest and that the plaintiff
had no cause of action. Thus, here again is a clear refusal to extend to an expectancy of inheri-
tance the protection which has come to be extended in a wide field of transactions." Evans,
supra note 6, at 199.
28 One early commentator identifies the issue as "[t]he question of the protection to be
extended to expectancies in decedents' estates from fraudulent interference." Evans, supra note
6, at 187.
29 See, e.g., George J. Blum, Annotation, Action for Tortious Interference With Bequest as
Precluded by Will Contest Remedy, 18 A.L.R. 5TH 211 (1994) ("It is well established that a
party to a contract, whether of employment or otherwise, has a right of action against one who
has procured a breach or termination of the document by the other involved party ... Interfer-
ence with a noncontractual relationship may be as actionable as interference with a contractual
relationship."). See also Evans, supra note 6, at 204 (There has been a "progressive extension
of a tort remedy for the protection of interests in advantageous relations . . . . [p]rospective
advantages may be protected," citing, e.g., protection from tortious interference with an em-
ployment relationship, though describing "protection ... to expectancies in decedents' estates
from fraudulent interference" as occupying "a twilight zone;" ultimately, Evans concludes "that
[Vol. 104
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tort of intentional interference with expectation of inheritance is often classified
with other commercial and non-commercial "interference" torts like interference
with contract, interference with prospective economic advantage, interference
with prospective employment or business relations, and interference with gift.
30
All of these are relatively contemporary legal innovations that expand the scope
of legal rights beyond what has been traditionally recognized, specifically by




In theory, the tort applies to both inter vivos and testamentary trans-
fers,32 and presents certain challenges to each.33 But no characterization of the
tort as a benign handmaiden to the probate system can disguise the more acute
threat it poses to the core business of the probate court. 34 Although effective
inter vivos transfers can be quite informal, requiring little more than delivery,
testamentary transfers remain highly formal, and are further protected by special
probate courts in each state, which are typically given exclusive jurisdiction
over wills and estate administration. State law gives probate courts exclusive
interferences with benefits reasonably to be expected from decedents' estates ... are, after all,
indistinguishable from interferences with prospective advantages in business relations and other
types of cases.").
30 This is the approach of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, which identifies the tort of
"intentional interference with inheritance or gift" as one form of the tort based on wrongful
interference with an expectancy. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 774B (1977). One com-
mentator states, "The cause of action for tortious interference with inheritance expands tort
liability for interference with prospective advantages .... Since English common law recog-
nized the tort of interference with prospective relations, tortious interference with inheritance is
traceable to that law." Marmai, supra note 5, at 297. This is also the explicit approach of the
West Virginia courts. See, e.g., Kessel v. Leavitt, 511 S.E.2d 720 (W. Va. 1998) (tortious inter-
ference with parental relationship); Torbett v. Wheeling Dollar Sav. & Trust Co., 314 S.E.2d
166 (W. Va. 1983) (tortious interference with business relationship); Barone v. Barone, 294
S.E.2d 260, 260 (W. Va. 1982). Barone is discussed infra.
31 The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS identifies the tort of "intentional interference with
inheritance or gift" as one form of the tort based on wrongful interference with an expectancy.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 774B (1977). This Section comprises all of Chapter 37A,
"Interference With Other Forms Of Advantageous Economic Relations," which is a subpart or
addendum to Chapter 37, "Interference With Contract Or Prospective Contractual Relation."
32 See supra note 27. Also, even commentators like Evans, who focus on expectations of
inheritance, acknowledge that inter vivos conveyances that interfere with inheritance are cov-
ered. See Evans, supra note 6, at 199-200.
33 For example, if the tortious conduct consists of using undue influence to procure inter
vivos transfers to the tortfeasor, the case may be litigated between the would-be heir and the
alleged tortfeasor even during the lifetime of a competent testator, who may not even be a
party, a possibility hardly congenial to the property owner's right to dispose of his property as
he pleases.
34 As one commentator states, "[T]he tort can play havoc with traditional probate law."
Fassold, supra note 5, at 30.
35 As Evans states, "An initial proposition is that only probate courts have jurisdiction to
probate wills and that a probate decree, like other judgments and decrees, is not subject to col-
lateral attack." Evans, supra note 6, at 188.
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jurisdiction to determine whether a particular document is the testator's will,36
whether the testator had testamentary capacity, 37 and otherwise to impeach or
establish a will.
38
The tort remedy permits a court of general jurisdiction to render judg-
ments that redistribute estate assets and undermine the finality of probated wills,
albeit in substance if not in form. For example, the tort case may determine that
a person was wrongly deprived of a bequest because the probated will was the
product of undue influence, or that the true will was never probated because it
was tortiously destroyed or suppressed, thus effectively "impeaching" the will,
regardless of whether these arguments were made before the probate court. Al-
ternatively or in addition, the tort case may determine the testator's true inten-
tions (to benefit the plaintiff), effectively "establishing" a different will than the
probated document. A successful tort claim will involve a finding that a per-
son's rightful inheritance was interfered with, and a judgment requiring the tort-
feasor to make the plaintiff whole. Furthermore, it will require the determination
of the deceased testator's intentions. If the tortfeasor was a taker under the will
or intestacy, the judgment as a practical matter will probably come out of the
inheritance, effectively redistributing estate assets. In these ways and others, a
common law court that recognizes the tort may in effect invalidate or modify a
probated will, or establish the will of a decedent already adjudicated to have
died intestate.39
The existence of a common law tort remedy also threatens the integrity
of the probate system at the procedural level. Probate law requirements for prov-
ing a testamentary disposition, including, for example, multiple witnesses, are
non-existent in courts of general civil jurisdiction, which require plaintiffs to
prove the elements of a tort - including the existence of the expectancy itself -
by a simple preponderance of the evidence. Validating the tort seems to require
or allow the court to second-guess a competent testator, and often in doing so, to
rely on the testimony of a very interested third party. In addition, modem pro-
bate statutes of limitations for will contests are typically around a year, much
shorter than the corresponding tort statutes.40 These relatively relaxed tort pro-
36 See, e.g., Smith v. Mustian, 234 S.E.2d 292, 296 (Va. 1977). This is the issue known as
"devisavit vel non."
37 Id.
38 Guilfoil v. Hayes, 86 F.2d 544, 545-46 (4th Cir. 1936) (claim brought to impeach or
establish a will is within exclusive probate court jurisdiction and subject to "probate exception"
to federal diversity jurisdiction).
39 For a case from the Third Circuit barring the tort claim when not preceded by a will
contest on the basis that "such a tort action offends the probate code by seeking in effect the
revocation of an accepted will and the probate of a rejected will," see Moore v. Graybeal, 843
F.2d 706, 710 (3d Cir. 1988) (cited in Reaves, supra note 6, at n.27).
40 MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 5-207 (2001) (petition to caveat must be filed within
six months of the appointment of a personal representative); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 31-32 (2000)
(three-year statute of limitations for filing caveat to a will); S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-3-401 (2000)
(six months to file a will contest before probate is conclusive); W. VA. CODE § 41-5-11 (2000)
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cedures are one factor that has led some, though not all, states to require plain-
tiffs to exhaust probate remedies or demonstrate their inadequacy before main-
taining the tort action, or even to bar the remedy altogether.
An action for damages based on tortious interference with expectation
of inheritance is sometimes thought of as a common law will contest, and state
courts that think of it this way have been understandably reluctant to recognize
the tort.41 Most states that recognize the tort - and at least one that has not yet
done so42 - see it as a secondary or "back-up" remedy, only to be used when, for
whatever reason, the probate court remedy would be inadequate.43 Such states,
when they do recognize the tort, typically require exhaustion of probate court
remedies or a demonstration of their inadequacy.44
Without such safeguards, the tort appears to pose a serious threat to the
integrity and self-sufficiency of the probate regime, by allowing a disappointed
heir to ignore the probate process (and its time limits) entirely and pursue his
inheritance in the form of damages at law. This approach inevitably derogates
from the authority of the probate court, either by redistributing estate assets (if
the defendant is a taker), a task generally within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
probate court by state statute,45 or by allowing a common law trial court to issue
(non-party may file an action in equity to impeach or establish a will within two years from the
date of the judgment of the circuit court that has acted upon an appeal from a county commis-
sion or from the commission's order if there was no appeal); W. VA. CODE § 55-2-12 (2000)
(limitations time does not begin until that tort is discovered, or by reasonable diligence should
have been discovered by the victim).
41 Of course, the scope of the action is somewhat wider, encompassing claims based, for
example, on wrongfully-procured inter vivos conveyances that deplete the estate. A claim with
this basis involves no attack on the will whatsoever.
42 See, e.g., Geduldig v. Posner, 743 A.2d 247 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1999) ("[T]he Court of
Appeals would recognize the tort if it were necessary to afford complete, but traditional, relief.
• .[i.e.,] where the traditional remedy [a will contest or an equitable action for constructive trust]
might be insufficient to correct the pecuniary loss.").
43 One commentator distinguishes between those states that "allow the suit as a primary
cause of action" and those that "treat the action as a last recourse, allowing the action upon
exhaustion of all other means of redress." Marmai, supra note 5, at 299-300. In this Article, I
prefer to distinguish between those states that impose an exhaustion requirement (or demonstra-
tion of the inadequacy of the probate remedy), and those that do not. Applying Marmai's dis-
tinction, North Carolina is a "last recourse" state, while West Virginia appears to be a "primary
cause of action" state. Marmai herself identifies North Carolina as a primary cause of action
state, but she does not take account of Holt, discussed infra. Id. at n.30.
44 See, e.g., Holt v. First Nat'l Bank of Mobile, 418 So.2d 77 (Ala. 1982); Bohannon v.
Wachovia Bank & Trust, 188 S.E. 390 (N.C. 1936); Dulin v. Bailey, 90 S.E. 689 (N.C. 1916).
As Evans puts it, "There is a disposition also on the part of courts to hold that if a claimant has
an adequate remedy in the probate court, he should not first resort to a court of general jurisdic-
tion." Evans, supra note 6, at 188. Of course, not all states define "adequate remedy" the same
way. For arguments against imposing an exhaustion / demonstration of inadequacy of probate
requirement, see Marmai, supra note 5, at 311-14.
45 It is for this reason, among others, that the tort action might appear to constitute an
impermissible collateral attack on the probate decree. Evans puts it under the heading, "Attack
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a judgment contradicting an unappealed probate court judgment (which lacked
the bequest at issue).46 It is almost inevitable that a successful tort plaintiff will
obtain from the civil court a judgment importantly "inconsistent" with that ren-
dered by the probate court.47 The sense in which the tort is or threatens to be an
impermissible collateral attack on the probate decree, therefore, cannot simply
be defined away.
It is hoped that these reflections make clear that a state's decision to
recognize the tort is more than a minor expansion in its tort scheme. Just as rec-
ognition of the tort of interference with prospective economic advantage adjusts
the boundaries between tort and contract, the tort of interference with prospec-
tive inheritance represents a significant incursion by tort law into traditional
probate precincts, and is not to be undertaken lightly.48 Nevertheless, the tort
meets an otherwise unmet need, an equally significant concern.
upon the Probate Decree" and states: "A serious issue is the question how the remedy in tort for
damages to plaintiffs expectancy is affected by a prior probate decree." Evans, supra note 6, at
202. In order to avoid the undesirable result of the tort-as-collateral-attack, Evans divides the
cases into those in which "a remedy is provisionally available both in the probate court and in a
law or equity court, [where] the former is to be preferred," and those in which the probate
action will fail "because of the destruction of evidence by the defendant," in which case the tort
"remedy constitutes no attack upon the probate decree." Id. at 202-04. Though this approach is
appealing, it is incomplete. It is not at all clear why the subsequent tort action is not an attack
upon the probate decree where the only probatable will was probated (even if the testator might
have intended something else). If the probate court finds that the testator died intestate, because
the proffered will was procured by undue influence and there is no other will, a tort action that
has the effect of transferring assets to someone who is not an intestate heir is clearly in sub-
stance an attack upon that probate decree. In addition, Evans fails to resolve whether the tort
action is an impermissible collateral attack on the probate decree in those situations in which
the plaintiffs inability to prove the bequest in probate court is not due to defendant's destruc-
tion of the evidence. There may not be any evidence, and that, itself, may be the result of the
defendant's wrongdoing (for example, by preventing a will from being executed). This analysis
also does not cover the case where the will itself can be probated, but the assets given to the
beneficiary have been conveyed inter vivos as the result of tortious conduct. Evans also does
not address whether a probate remedy is "adequate" even if litigation expenses will reduce the
bequest or conduct warranting an award of punitive damages (which the probate court can
never award) has occurred.
46 These concerns provide a possible answer to the question posed by one early commenta-
tor: "Is there any objection to allowing the victim an election whether to raise his claim in the
probate court or later in a common law court?" Evans, supra note 6, at 188 (citing Joseph War-
ren, Fraud, Undue Influence and Mistake in Wills, 41 HARV. L. REv. 309, 320-22 (1928)).
47 As one commentator puts it, "The tort can play havoc with traditional probate law....
[Will] [c]ontestants whose evidence would not survive summary judgment [in probate court]
may be tempted to throw in a tortious interference claim, lessen the burden of proof, and
thereby do an end-run around settled probate law." Fassold, supra note 5, at 30.
48 Other "dangers" associated with the tort include judge and jury confusion about "what the
decedent would have done, had certain events not occurred"; fraudulent and frivolous claims;
and the possibility that estate-planning attorneys may be named as defendants. Id. at 30-31.
[Vol. 104
14
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 104, Iss. 2 [2002], Art. 4
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol104/iss2/4
REVENGE OF THE DISAPPOINTED HEIR
HI. STATES RECOGNIZING THE TORT - NORTH CAROLINA AND WEST VIRGINIA
Two states in the Fourth Circuit, North Carolina and West Virginia,
recognize the tort of intentional interference with expectation of inheritance.
Because neither of them follows the elements set out by the Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Torts § 774B, the analysis here will not be framed in those terms.49 In-
stead, the tort is presented in each court's own words. After reviewing the rele-
vant cases, an analysis will be offered which attempts to identify the elements of
the tort as it exists today in North Carolina and West Virginia.
A. North Carolina
North Carolina was one of the first states in the entire United States to
recognize this tort. Eighty-five years ago, the North Carolina Supreme Court
authorized a common-law remedy (in a state court of general jurisdiction)
against one whose tortious conduct results in another being wrongfully deprived
of an inheritance. 50 Two later North Carolina Supreme Court cases from the first
part of the last century address the tort squarely, and a fourth more recent case
indirectly supports it.
In the first case, Dulin v. Bailey,51 the defendants 52 and others allegedly
physically removed a portion of the testator's will including the legacy to the
plaintiff. The plaintiff did not attack the will as presented for probate, nor did
she attempt to prove up a different will. However, she did allege that such an
attempt would have surely failed: "She allege[d] that she d[id] not attempt to set
up the second will because the evidence accessible to her would not prove its
entire contents. 53 Instead, she filed a tort claim. The North Carolina Supreme
Court reversed a lower court's decision granting defendant's demurrer and
"nonsuiting" (dismissing) the plaintiff, thereby recognizing the tort. The court
acknowledged that "this action seems to be of the first impression in this state,
and is doubtless a very unusual one, 54 but was not deterred, relying on older
British cases allowing a legatee to obtain damages for spoliation and suppres-
sion of a will, particularly where the plaintiffs inability to prove the alternate
49 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 774B reads as follows: "One who by fraud, duress or
other tortious means intentionally prevents another from receiving from a third person an in-
heritance or gift that he would otherwise have received is subject to liability to the other for
loss of the inheritance or gift."
so Dulin v. Bailey, 90 S.E. 689 (N.C. 1916).
51 Id.
52 The opinion does not indicate the family or marital relationships between testator,
plaintiff, and defendants, other than that the named defendant and the testator have the same
last name (Bailey). The plaintiff, a woman with a different last name, may be a married daugh-
ter. Id.
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disposition was the result of the defendant's wrongful conduct.55
The court was primarily guided by its conviction that a legatee unable to
prove up a will (or bequest) should not be left without a remedy:
If she cannot prove the destroyed will because [she was] unable
to prove the entire contents thereof, surely she is entitled to re-
cover of the defendants for the wrong they have done her by the
conspiracy and destruction of the will, and the measure of her
damages will be the legacy of which she has been deprived.56
In validating the tort, the court did not consider, as many more contem-
porary jurisdictions do, whether an equitable remedy, for example, a construc-
tive trust to the extent of her legacy, would have been available or preferable.57
In the 1936 case of Bohannon v. Wachovia Bank & Trust,58 the second
North Carolina Supreme Court case on this tort, Ernest Bohannon alleged that
two of his female relatives prevented his grandfather from making a will leaving
Ernest a large share of his estate. 59 The case arose from Ernest's attempt to con-
55 Id. at 689-90. Hence, this case would fall into the eighth of Professor Warren's nine
situations involving fraud, undue influence, and mistake in wills: (1) cases where the probate
court has jurisdiction and can do complete justice by refusing probate; (2) cases where claimant
has been defrauded of a legacy where the probate court can afford no remedy; (3) cases of
express trusts; (4) cases where there was an oral promise to hold in trust; (5) cases where the
problem is one of construction; (6) cases of fraudulent revocation and prevention of republica-
tion; (7) cases of fraudulent prevention of revocation; (8) cases where the fraud of defendant
has created a difficulty respecting proof; (9) cases of forged will defrauding the next of kin.
Evans, supra note 6, at 188 (citing Warren, supra note 46). (It appears that some situations
might fall into more than one category,) Evans cites Dulin with approval, under the heading,
"Inducing the Revocation or Alteration of Wills." Evans, supra note 6, at 195. Evans also dis-
cusses Dulin under the heading, "The Suppression and Spoliation of Wills," where he explains,
So, in Dulin v. Bailey, the plaintiff was permitted to prove his right to a leg-
acy in a tort action by only one witness, whereas two are required to prove
the contents of a will offered for probate. The plaintiff, in such a case, may
prove his own legacy without proof of entire will, though generally to pro-
cure probate, proof of the entire contents of a lost will is likely to be re-
quired.
Evans, supra note 6, at 198-99.
56 Dulin v. Bailey, 90 S.E. 689, 690 (N.C. 1916).
57 The availability of a constructive trust remedy is addressed in Johnson v. Stevenson, 152
S.E.2d 214 (N.C. 1967), discussed infra.
58 188 S.E. 390 (N.C. 1936).
59 Id. at 393. The plaintiffs last name is Bohannon, and his grandfather, the decedent whose
estate is at issue, is also surnamed Bohannon. One defendant is named Maude Bohannon Trot-
man. The bank named as defendant is executor and trustee of the estate of the other woman,
Laura Webb Bohannon. It is unknown whether these women are the plaintiff's sister, mother,
sister-and-law, aunt or aunts, or other relatives. This is the sort of case discussed by Evans
under the heading, "Frustration of Testamentary Execution," where he says, "Inasmuch as the
probate court cannot grant relief where the testator has been prevented from executing a will,
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duct pre-filing discovery on Maude Bohannon Trotman.60 In opposing Ernest's
application to depose her, Maude argued that Ernest was "attempting to main-
tain this action on grounds not recognized by law as constituting a cause of ac-
tion ' '61 - namely, the claim of tortious interference with his expected inheri-
tance. In recognizing a cause of action, the court explicitly analogized Ernest's
claim to tortious interference with contract and prospective contract, and also
looked to Mitchell v. Langley,62 a Georgia case from 1915 which recognized the
tort: 63 "If the plaintiff can recover against the defendant for the malicious and
wrongful interference with the making of a contract, we see no good reason why
he cannot recover for the malicious and wrongful interference with the making
of a will."64 The plaintiff alleged that he was the testator' s grandson, and that his
grandfather "had formed the fixed intention and settled purpose of providing for
[him]" in his estate.65 He also alleged that the two women "conspired to de-
prive" him of his share, by prevailing upon the grandfather not to leave the
plaintiff "a large share in his estate" by will or trust.66 Finally, he alleged that
"but for" the wrongful acts of the two women, the plan would have been carried
out.67 According to the court, these allegations were sufficient to state a claim
for "wrongful interference with the making of a will. '68 The court noted that the
claim may be difficult to prove, but correctly stated that "that does not touch the
the plaintiff would be without remedy if a decree of distribution.. .were res judicata." Evans,
supra note 6, at 192. Evans discusses Bohannon with approval, saying,
Thus, it is seen that the inquiry in such cases is coming to be not, Was the
plaintiff vested with an interest in the property about to be left to him, but
rather, Was there a right to have his prospect not interfered with fraudu-
lently which should be protected? There appears to be no adequate reason
why the plaintiff should not have alternative remedies, one at law for tort to
his expectancy or one in equity to raise a trust.
Id. at 193.
60 Bohannon, 188 S.E. at 390-92. This case took place prior to the institution of modem
discovery practices, including mandatory disclosure requirements. However, state law made
certain forms of discovery available on the basis of affidavits even before the complaint was
filed. Id. at 394.
61 Id. at 392.
62 85 S.E. 1050 (Ga. 1915).
63 Bohannon, 188 S.E. at 393. Puzzlingly, the Supreme Court of North Carolina does not
cite Dulin v. Bailey, 90 S.E. 689 (N.C. 1916), its own prior case, in direct support of the tort.
64 Bohannon, 188 S.E. at 394.
65 Id. at 393.
66 Id.
67 Id.
68 Id. at 394.
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existence of the cause of action, but only its establishment. ' 69
Although the North Carolina Supreme Court did not cite Dulin in sup-
port of its recognition of the tort, there is no apparent conflict between the two
cases. The primary factual difference is that in Dulin, the tortious conduct con-
sisted of actual physical destruction of part of an executed will favoring the
plaintiff, while in Bohannon the conduct involved preventing any such will from
coming into being. It seems unlikely this difference would have mattered to the
Dulin court, which was guided by the idea that a wronged legatee unable to
prove up a bequest in a probate court should not be left without a remedy. It is
less clear whether the Bohannon court would have validated Dulin's cause of
action, but only because Bohannon focused on interference with the making of a
will, an analogy to the making of a contract. Certainly nothing in Bohannon
undermines a claim based on physical spoliation, destruction, or suppression of
a will. In fact, to the extent that Dulin's expectancy was better established than
Bohannon's - a will in her favor was actually executed - it is difficult to imag-
ine that the Bohannon court would not have recognized her claim.
On the basis of Dulin and Bohannon, it appears that the tort is clearly
recognized in the state of North Carolina. However, the 1950 case of Holt v.
Holt7° at best considerably limits access to the remedy, and at worst, casts rec-
ognition of the tort itself into doubt. In Holt, two disinherited sons filed a tort
claim against their brothers, grantees of inter vivos conveyances and devisees
under the will of their father. 7' They sought damages from their brothers, who
allegedly used fraud or undue influence to induce their father to convey and will
his property to them in order to intentionally defraud the disinherited brothers of
their rights of inheritance.72 The disinherited brothers allegedly did not learn of
the will until after its admission to probate, and did not learn of the inter vivos
conveyances during their father's lifetime.73 (The opinion does not state whether
the disinherited brothers filed a will contest, but in any event, it does not appear
that the time to do so had expired.) The North Carolina Supreme Court held that
the will could be attacked only by caveat, and that, unless and until the will was
declared invalid in a caveat proceeding, the disinherited brothers lacked stand-
ing to maintain an action for damages.74 Read narrowly, this result might be
taken simply as imposing an exhaustion requirement on tort plaintiffs, and in
order to harmonize it with Dulin and Bohannon, this is the most favored ap-
proach.
But what is most difficult about the opinion in Holt - which does not
69 Id.
70 61 S.E.2d 448 (N.C. 1950).
71 Id. at 450-51.
72 Id. at 450.
73 Id. at 45 1.
74 Id. at 453.
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even mention Dulin or Bohannon, much less distinguish them - is the reasoning,
not the result. In Holt, the North Carolina Supreme Court held that the disinher-
ited brothers had to have the will struck down in probate court before maintain-
ing the tort claim, not on an exhaustion or adequacy-of-probate-remedy theory,
but on the basis that only in this way can the right to challenge the transfers,
which belonged only to the father, descend to them intestate. 75 The opinion is
openly hostile to the idea that there is any independent right in the disinherited
sons, based on loss of an expectancy, even based on the intentional act of an-
other and after the death of the parent.76
At the very least, after Holt, it appears that if there is a will, a successful
result at the probate court level is a prerequisite to maintaining a tort claim. This
is a significant limitation because those who succeed in probate court may have
no damages left to allege in a common law court, while those who fail in an
attack by caveat will apparently be barred from proceeding in tort. The tort will
not be available precisely where it is needed most. Furthermore, the rationale of
Holt clearly suggests that persons who would not inherit (intestate or under a
prior will) certain rights of action formerly belonging to the decedent could
never maintain the tort, because the "derivative" right to do so would never be-
long to them.
Holt does seem to allow the tort as the second part of a two-part attack
on a will. First, the plaintiff would have the disadvantageous will declared inva-
lid (for example, as procured by undue influence), and then, if necessary, a sec-
ond proceeding could be brought at common law to establish a bequest he or she
could not establish in probate court (for Dulin- or Bohannon-type reasons).77 In
75 Id. at 452-53 ("[I]f the cause of action still exists in the person making the conveyance at
the time of his death, it passes to those who then succeed to his rights.... [T]he plaintiffs have
no standing to maintain these suits until the probated paper writing is declared invalid as a
testamentary instrument by a competent tribunal in a caveat proceeding; for such paper writing
wills all rights existing in A.F. Holt, Sr., at the time of his death to the defendants, with the
result that nothing descends to the [plaintiffs].").
76 Id. at 451-52 ("In the last analysis, the wrong charged ... is that of procuring property
from the decedent, A.F. Holt, Sr., by fraud or undue influence. As we shall see, this was a
wrong against the decedent, and not a wrong against the plaintiffs. Hence the plaintiffs are
asserting alleged rights which are essentially derivatives from their ancestor. The significance
of this fact must not be obscured in any degree by the allegations of the complaints that the
alleged conspirators procured the conveyances from A.F. Holt, Sr., to deprive the plaintiffs of
their rights of inheritance as prospective heirs and distributees of their then living ancestor. A
child possesses no interest whatever in the property of a living parent. He has a mere intangi-
ble hope of succession.... In so far as his children are concerned, a parent has an absolute right
to dispose of his property by gift or otherwise as he pleases .... These things being true, a child
has no standing at law or in equity either before or after the death of his parent to attack a
conveyance by the parent as being . . . in deprivation of his right of inheritance." (emphasis
added)).
77 One commentator suggests as a matter of strategy that "a successful will contestant may
be well advised to bring a subsequent action for tortious interference, seeking punitive damages
in the amount of the attorney's fees incurred in the will contest." Fassold, supra note 5, at 28. If
the will contestant had to pay his or her own attorney's fees, this might work; however, if the
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addition, read narrowly, Holt is arguably inapplicable if there is no will (for
example, cases of intestacy or interference based on preventing a will or on inter
vivos conveyances alone), or perhaps if there was interference with the right to
bring a caveat proceeding (for example, by fraud or threats), as alluded to in
Johnson v. Stevenson,78 the last of the North Carolina Supreme Court cases rele-
vant to this tort.
Johnson, a 1967 constructive trust case, stands for the proposition that
inadequacy of the probate court remedy is a prerequisite to maintaining an ac-
tion outside the probate court that "changes radically the legal significance and
consequences of the judgment or decree of probate.,, 79 Arguably, therefore, it
applies to the tort claim, although indirectly.
In Johnson, the daughter of the testator sought to impose a constructive
trust on realty devised by her parents to her brother and sister-in-law and their
children.8° She did not attack the will at any time during the seven years then
permitted for filing a caveat. 8' Instead, many years later, she filed an equitable
action, alleging that the will was the result of undue influence, and sought a con-
structive trust to the extent of her intestate share.82 The defendants demurred,
and their demurrer was granted, sustained on appeal, and affirmed by the North
Carolina Supreme Court. 83 The plaintiff had not only failed to attack the will
directly by caveat, she also did not allege that her right to bring such a caveat
proceeding "was interfered with in any manner by her brother or his wife or by
any other person or circumstance." 84 Taken together, plaintiffs failure to avail
herself of a caveat proceeding that could have given her complete relief, and
failure to allege interference with her right to do so, proved fatal to her construc-
tive trust claim. 85 Johnson thus imposes a requirement either of exhaustion of
estate paid, whether the will contestant sustained any damages would depend on the facts. Also,
a number of states do not consider the absence of punitive damages as sufficient to demonstrate
the inadequacy of the probate court remedy, and thus the tort plaintiff would be unable to plead
and prove an essential element of the tort claim. For example, the Missouri court has expressly
held that the unavailability of punitive damages in the will contest does not render the probate
remedy "inadequate." McMullin v. Borgers, 761 S.W.2d 718, 720 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988).
78 152 S.E.2d 214 (N.C. 1967).
79 Id. at 217.
80 Id. at 215-16. The brother and sister-in-law received a life estate, with the remainder
going to the grandchildren. Id. at 215.
81 Id. at 216.
82 Id.
83 Id. at 216, 218.
84 Id. at 218.
85 Id. at 218 ("The grounds on which plaintiff seeks to establish a constructive trust [undue
influence] were equally available as grounds for direct attack on the will by Caveat. This right
of direct attack by Caveat gave her a full and complete remedy at law. Hence, plaintiff, on the
facts alleged, is not entitled to equitable relief.").
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probate remedies or demonstration of their inadequacy. 86 It also suggests that
interference with the right to file a direct attack - perhaps by threats or misrep-
resentation - can either fulfill the requirement or relieve the plaintiff of the re-
quirement to exhaust probate court remedies.
The results of Johnson are consistent with Dulin or Bohannon, as the
plaintiffs in those cases would have been unable to obtain a complete remedy in
probate court - in Dulin because of an inadequate number of witnesses, and in
Bohannon both because the will benefiting the grandson was never written, and
because the grandson was (apparently) not the intestate heir. The difficulty,
again, comes in reconciling these cases with Holt. It is unclear in Dulin whether
the plaintiff was an intestate heir of the decedent, though it appears she was not,
at least not to the extent of her bequest, or she would not have needed to prove it
up in order to recover fully. In Bohannon, it is stated that the grandson-plaintiff
was not an intestate heir of the decedent. Thus, on the rationale of Holt, neither
the Dulin nor the Bohannon plaintiff had standing. Notwithstanding Holt, and
perhaps only because Holt does not explicitly repudiate the tort, out-of-state
post-Holt cases and authoritative sources continue to count North Carolina
among states recognizing the tort.
87
What are the elements of the tort in North Carolina? As noted above,
neither of the Fourth Circuit states that recognize the tort do so by reference to
the Restatement or its specific formulation of the tort. As stated above, the 1916
Dulin court states:
If she cannot prove the destroyed will because [she was]unable
to prove the entire contents thereof, surely she is entitled to re-
cover of the defendants for the wrong they have done her by the
conspiracy and destruction of the will, and the measure of her
damages will be the legacy of which she has been deprived.88
At this stage, we can say that the tort required at least (1) the existence of an
expectancy ("the legacy of which she has been deprived"); (2) conduct resulting
in this deprivation ("the wrong they have done her"); and (3) damages. The
remedy available from the probate court must also be inadequate ("if she cannot
prove the destroyed will ... surely she is entitled to recover of the defendants").
It is not clear from Dulin whether the conduct must be intended to deprive the
plaintiff of her legacy, or indeed, whether the conduct must be independently
tortious. Although the conspiracy and destruction of the will were intentional,
the court seemed to place greater emphasis on the position of the plaintiff than
on the state of mind of the defendants. Even the accidental destruction of a will
86 The Johnson court also discusses the issue of intrinsic versus extrinsic fraud in the
context of constructive trust, which is not directly relevant to the tort issue. See id.
87 See, e.g., Anderson v. Meadowcroft, 661 A.2d 726, 728 (Md. 1995) (citing Bohannon).
58 Dulin v. Bailey, 90 S.E. 689, 690 (N.C. 1916) (citation omitted).
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might leave her in this situation, and nothing in Dulin rules out a claim under
those circumstances.
In Bohannon, decided twenty years later, a clearer structure of elements
can be discerned. The plaintiffs adequately-pleaded claim included (1) a valid
expectancy (his blood relationship to the testator, and the testator's "fixed inten-
tion and settled purpose of providing for him" in his estate89); (2) intentional
interference with that expectancy (the defendants "conspired to deprive" him of
his share, by prevailing upon the grandfather not to leave the plaintiff "a large
share in his estate" by will or trust9°); (3) independently tortious conduct9' (the
conspiracy); (4) reasonable certainty that absent the tortious interference the
plaintiff would have received the expectancy ("but for" the wrongful acts of the
defendant, the testator's plan would have been carried out92); and (5) damages
(the "large share" of the estate93).94
With respect to the first element, one commentator on the tort in general
suggests that "[t]he clearest proof of an expectancy is an earlier will," although
"[a] draft or a testator's written intention may be sufficient to establish an ex-
pectancy," 95 but North Carolina does not set the standard so high. Although the
plaintiff in Dulin was a beneficiary under an earlier will, it does not appear that
the expectancy in Bohannon ever went beyond "a fixed intention and settled
purpose" - i.e., it was never reduced to writing. The same commentator suggests
that in theory "a long-estranged son or daughter could establish expectancy
based solely on the parent-child relationship, 96 but under Holt, a valid expec-
tancy in North Carolina must consist of more than mere status as the potential
intestate heir of a testate decedent.97
89 Bohannon v. Wachovia Bank & Trust, 188 S.E. 390, 393 (N.C. 1936).
90 Id.
91 "Typical intentional torts include assault, battery, slander, libel, defamation, trespass,
conversion, forgery, alteration, suppression of a will, fraud, duress, undue influence, and abuse
of fiduciary duty or confidential relationship. The plaintiff must allege at least one of these
types of conduct; recklessness or negligence are not enough." Shirley, supra note 5, at 18.
92 Bohannon, 188 S.E. at 393.
93 Id.
94 The closest any of one of the North Carolina cases comes to the issue of precisely how
damages are to be measured is Dulin, which describes it as "the legacy of which she has been
deprived." 90 S.E. at 690. None contemplate whether, for example, the legacy should be "dis-
counted" by the probability that the testator would have disinherited the plaintiff even absent
the interference, as suggested by Driscoll, supra note 5, at 540.
95 Fassold, supra note 5, at 27.
96 Id. (referring to Arizona's intestacy statutes).
97 61 S.E.2d at 451-52. To this extent, North Carolina diverges from states like Georgia and
Illinois that find an expectancy "if an intending donor or testator has actually taken steps to-
ward perfecting the gift, devise, or bequest, so that if left alone the interest will cease to be
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Although Dulin is more explicit on this point than Bohannon, taken to-
gether with Johnson, these cases clearly indicate that North Carolina requires
that a will contest not be an adequate remedy before allowing a plaintiff to
maintain the tort (or obtain an equitable remedy). 98 Unfortunately, no case pro-
vides a clear standard of adequacy or inadequacy. 99 Put another way, the spe-
cific rationales offered by the Dulin and Bohannon courts in support of the tort
would not apply to a plaintiff who could bring a caveat proceeding (will contest)
and receive his or her legacy in full thereby. 100 To the extent that Holt permits
the claim at all, it makes clear that if there is a will to challenge, the would-be
tort plaintiff must challenge it, and successfully, before bringing any further
common law claim.
Although Dulin and Bohannon attach significance to the plaintiff's in-
ability to prove the bequest in the probate court, neither shows any concern for
traditional distinctions between law and equity in recognizing the tort. Neither
case considers whether an equitable action seeking a constructive trust would be
an acceptable or preferable alternative to the action at law for damages; in fact,
neither opinion even mentions whether the tortfeasor-interferers were benefici-
aries of the estate at issue (and hence whether a constructive trust remedy would
be suitable). Nor does either case display any concern with whether recognition
of the tort will inappropriately extend the legal remedies available for this wrong
98 Although there is an A.L.R. annotation on the topic, "Action For Tortious Interference
With Bequest As Precluded By Will Contest Remedy," it does not mention any North Carolina
cases, or indeed, any cases from states in the Fourth Circuit. See Blum, supra note 29.
99 By contrast, for example, the Missouri court has expressly held that the unavailability of
punitive damages in the will contest does not render the probate remedy "inadequate." Reaves,
supra note 5, at 565 (citing McMullin v. Borgers, 761 S.W.2d 718, 720 (Mo. Ct App. 1988)).
In addition, a subsequent action for punitive damages or litigation expenses is also barred. Id.
(citing Smith v. Chatfield, 797 S.W.2d 508, 510 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990)). Hence, the advice of one
commentator "to bring a subsequent action for tortious interference, seeking punitive damages
in the amount of the attorney's fees incurred in the will contest," Fassold, supra note 5, at 29,
will not work in Missouri. (But see his later remark: "Punitive damages are generally not avail-
able in a will contest. This unavailability does not itself constitute inadequate relief, such that a
contestant would be permitted automatically to bring a tort action in which such damages are
sought." Id. at 29.) It is unclear whether it would work in North Carolina. In Missouri, inade-
quacy of the probate remedy will be found where "plaintiff could not discover the fraudulent
suppression of a valid will until the probate period had run, plaintiff was unable to establish a
maliciously destroyed will in probate, or defendant tortiously induced an inter vivos transfer of
assets that would have passed to plaintiff under a will." Reaves, supra note 5, at 566 (citing
Wilburn v. Meyer, 329 S.W.2d 228 (Mo. Ct. App. 1959) and McMullin, 761 S.W.2d at 720).
Under Missouri law, Dulin would clearly be allowed as falling into the second category above,
but Bohannon is less clear.
10o One commentator identifies four reasons for imposing an exhaustion requirement: (1)
"the plaintiff sustains no harm when a lost, destroyed or suppressed will is entered into pro-
bate;" (2) because probate courts have exclusive jurisdiction to probate wills, a plaintiff must
seek a remedy there first; (3) the tort action is "a collateral attack on the probate decree"; and
(4) "permitting the primary tort action contravenes public policy" which requires that the will
of every deceased person be offered for probate if it exists. Marmai, supra note 5, at 303-05.
Clearly these reasons are closely related to one another.
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beyond those traditionally available in equity or the probate court itself.
B. West Virginia
West Virginia recognizes the tort and permits broad access to it. It also
appears that timely cases based exclusively on inter vivos transfers are permit-
ted. In the 1982 case of Barone v. Barone,'0 the West Virginia Supreme Court
of Appeals found "tortious interference with a testamentary bequest to be a tort
in West Virginia.' '10 2 In Barone, a dispute arose among siblings regarding the
estate of their father, whose will had been probated more than three years be-
fore. 0 3 One sister counter- and cross-claimed against her brothers, on the basis
of evidence that emerged during the underlying lawsuit that one of her brothers,
an attorney, had changed the father's will, executed on his deathbed, thereby
depriving her of her share "contrary to their father's wishes."' 4 She alleged that
the probated will was procured by undue influence, and also alleged fraud.105
The trial court dismissed her claim as a "collateral attack on a duly probated
will," brought after the two-year probate contest statute of limitations had ex-
pired. °6
The Supreme Court of Appeals reversed on the basis that the sister "was
not trying to impeach or establish a will, but was complaining about a tortious
injury and also alleging equitable fraud - causes that could not even be heard in
the probate proceedings. Therefore, the probate contest statute of limitations did
not apply."'' 0 7 Why could the sister's claims "not even be heard" in probate
court? According to the court,
Equitable fraud actions are not strictly within probate court ju-
risdiction that is statutorily established and limited to 'ascer-
tain[ing] whether, and if any, how much, of what was so offered
for probate, be the will of the decedent.' The only issue deter-
minable in a probate court is devisavit vel non, to decide the
mechanical integrity of an instrument purporting to be a will.,0 8
The court applied the same reasoning to the sister's tortious interference claim
(based on undue influence):
101 294 S.E.2d 260 (W. Va. 1982).
102 Id. at 264.
103 Id. at 261.
104 Id.; see also Calacino v. McCutcheon, 356 S.E.2d 23, 26 (W. Va. 1987).
105 Barone, 294 S.E.2d at 261.
106 Id.; W. VA. CODE § 41-5-11 (1997).
107 Barone, 294 S.E.2d at 262.
108 Id. at 263. (quoting W. VA. CODE § 41-5-11) (footnotes and citations omitted).
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This tort is not within probate court jurisdiction . . . (see argu-
ment, supra), and Code 41-5-1 I's time limits are inapplicable.
Code 55-2-12 covers the limitations time, and its count does not
begin until that tort is discovered or, by reasonable diligence
should have been discovered by the victim. 109
This decision allows very broad access to the tort remedy. Later cases
analogize this tort to other "interference" torts rather than considering it as a
supplement or threat to the probate scheme." 1° Even after probate is closed, and
no contest was brought, it appears that a plaintiff may allege the tort based on a
claim that could have been heard by the probate court, such as that the will was
procured by undue influence. To reach this conclusion, the court took an ex-
tremely formalistic approach. The sister presented no will, nor did she formally
seek to "impeach" the will probated years before; she did not seek to have the
entire will stricken and the testator declared intestate, although she sought revo-
cation of the bequests to her brothers. In that sense, it is accurate to say that the
sister was not asking the court to "establish" a will, or any particular provisions
of a will.
Nevertheless, if her tort suit succeeded on remand (or her equitable
fraud suit, for that matter), her lost bequest would be restored to her (by making
her brother or brothers liable to her for that amount), in that sense "revoking"
the bequests to them, and the distribution of the estate would be altered without
conforming to will formalities (for example, multiple witnesses). In substance,
she was surely impeaching the will her brother drafted and attempting to estab-
lish an alternative testamentary scheme. But because she was doing so in the
form of an independent tort, she was allowed to proceed years after the close of
probate. The court did not even discuss whether "by reasonable diligence" she
could have discovered the draftsman's fraud in time to contest the will. She was
simply permitted to bring the tort suit, notwithstanding her failure to contest the
probate of the will when she had the chance.'
A later case indirectly extends the tort to inter vivos transfers, making
109 Id. at 264.
110 In Torbett v. Wheeling Dollar Sav. & Trust Co., 314 S.E.2d 166 (W. Va. 1983), the West
Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals recognized the tort of interference with prospective em-
ployment or business relations by restrictive employment contract, and stated, "We have recog-
nized tortious interference with business interests, with contractual relations, and with a testa-
mentary bequest." Id. at 171 (citations omitted). In Kessel v. Leavitt, 511 S.E.2d 720 (W. Va.
1998), tortious interference with expectation of inheritance is classed along with other "inter-
ference" torts, such as interference with an employment relationship and interference with a
contractual relationship, in the court's discussion of whether a tort of interference with parental
or custodial relationship is simply "a logical progression of this jurisdiction's pre-existing tor-
tious interference law." Id. at 763.
,, Contrast, for example, North Carolina law, where, under Holt, discussed supra, such a
suit could not be maintained.
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clear that the tort statute of limitations begins to run at the later of the time of
transfer or the time the plaintiff became aware of it. In the 1987 case of
Calacino v. McCutcheon,1 2 the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals de-
clined to make the tort available to plaintiffs seeking to rescind an inter vivos
transfer made seven years before the death of the donor and also seeking dam-
ages for tortious interference, where the plaintiffs were aware of the transfer at
the time and did not file a claim until long after the two-year tort statute of limi-
tations had expired." 13 This suggests, at least, that a timely tort claim based ex-
clusively on inter vivos transfers would be permitted.
In Barone, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals did not identify
the specific elements of the tort, beyond analogizing it to interference with busi-
ness interests and interference with contractual relations. 14 The court cited the
cases of a number of other jurisdictions with approval (Florida, Georgia, Iowa,
Maine, Massachusetts, New Jersey, and Ohio.) 1 5 Although these jurisdictions
did not analyze the tort identically, most adhered to the five-part formulation set
out above in Bohannon. West Virginia does not impose any exhaustion require-
ment, and Calacino seems to permit a timely tort claim based solely on inter
vivos conveyances.
IV. STATES NOT RECOGNIZING THE TORT - MARYLAND, SOUTH CAROLINA,
AND VIRGINIA
A.' Maryland
Although the Maryland courts seems sympathetic to the tort in princi-
ple,' 16 none has yet encountered a factual situation warranting relief, and all
have so far declined to recognize it. Maryland's highest court, the Maryland
112 356 S.E.2d 23 (W. Va. 1987).
113 Id. at 26.
11 294 S.E.2d at 264.
Id.
116 A federal district court in Maryland recently seemed open to the possibility that the state
might recognize the tort. "Insofar as plaintiff bases his state law claims on tortious interference
with economic advantage, it is conceivable than an individual who so interferes with a prospec-
tive inheritance could be liable in tort." Conboy v. Norwest Bank Indiana, N.A., No. Civ. S 94-
1851, 1994 WL 621605 (D. Md. July 13, 1994) (citing W. PAGE KEETON, ET AL., PROSSER AND
KEETON ON TORTS 1007-08 (W. Page Keeton et al. eds., 5th ed. 1984)). It appears that the plain-
tiff made allegations that a niece of the testator and a church unduly influenced the testator in
such a way as to deprive him of his inheritance. Id. at *1. However, the plaintiff did not sue the
niece or the church, but only the personal representative and trustee of the estate, and "[u]nder
no principle of law known to this Court is the present defendant, as personal representative or
trustee, 'ultimately liable,' to use plaintiffs allegation, for such tortious conduct." Id. Perhaps
had Conboy sued the appropriate defendants, the Maryland federal court would have had to
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Court of Appeals, has not yet answered the issue. The claim of the plaintiff in
the first Maryland appellate case addressing the tort, Anderson v. Meadow-
croft,117 failed because the plaintiff alleged just six of the seven elements of un-
due influence under Maryland law. The court therefore did not need to reach the
issue of whether the tort was recognized. The second Maryland case, Geduldig
v. Posner,118 failed essentially because the tort claim duplicated a straightfor-
ward (and concurrent) will contest based on undue influence. As the Geduldig
court stated,
[T]he Court of Appeals would recognize the tort if it were nec-
essary to afford complete, but traditional, relief ... where the
traditional remedy [a will contest or an equitable action for con-
structive trust] might be insufficient to correct the pecuniary
loss. The question of viability and application of the tort de-
pends on the facts in a given case.' 19
Hence, in Maryland, recognition of the tort seems merely to await a proper set
of facts, perhaps one involving dissipation of estate assets intended for a benefi-
ciary who is not an intestate heir.
The Maryland Court of Appeals first addressed the tort in 1995, in
Anderson v. Meadowcroft. 120 Paul Meadowcroft died in November, 1987.121 His
probated will left most of his estate to his cousin, Francis, rather than his three
surviving brothers. 22 The brothers filed, then dismissed, a caveat proceeding.
1 23
In October, 1993, long after Maryland's six-month statute of limitations on ca-
veat proceedings had expired in June of 1988, someone named Maxine Ander-
son filed a complaint alleging that Francis tortiously interfered with her ex-
pected inheritance. 24 She alleged that she was Meadowcroft's daughter and his
beneficiary under a 1975 will.1 25 She also alleged that Francis, an attorney, en-
gaged in undue influence, coercion, and persuasion to induce Meadowcroft to
change his will, and that Francis himself drafted it. 126 Maxine's first complaint
117 661 A.2d 726 (Md. 1995).
1S 743 A.2d 247 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1999).
19 Id. at 257.
120 661 A.2d 726 (Md. 1995).
121 Id. at 726.
122 Id.
123 Id.
124 Id. at 726-27.
125 Id.
126 Id. at 727.
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alleged conversion and fraud; 127 and on appeal after a dismissal, Maxine re-
framed the case to "draw... into question whether interference with an expected
inheritance and fraud in the procurement of a will are viable causes of action in
Maryland."
128
In setting the stage to answer this question as it pertains to tortious inter-
ference (as distinct from fraud), the Maryland court first recited the Restatement
§ 774B formulation of the tort. 29 The court acknowledged that many jurisdic-
tions recognize the tort, including Maryland's sister states in the Fourth Circuit,
North Carolina and West Virginia, as well as Georgia, Iowa, Maine, Massachu-
setts, Missouri, New Mexico, Ohio, and Texas. 30 The court also noted that
many of these states require the plaintiff to exhaust probate proceedings or dem-
onstrate their inadequacy.13 1 Finally, the court stated that in 1994 Maryland
"adopted the tort of wrongful or malicious interference with economic rela-
tions."' 132 In discussing both Restatement § 774B and Maryland's tort of inter-
ference with economic relations, the court stressed the element of "conduct tor-
tious in itself," also described as conduct that is "independently wrongful or
unlawful.' 33
Before Anderson, Maryland had "not yet considered expanding the tort
to apply to interference with gifts or bequests, nor ... the compatibility of such
an expansion with caveat proceedings."'' 34 Unfortunately, even after its careful
exposition of the tort, the court did not reach these issues, "because [it held] that
the complaint [did] not adequately allege undue influence, which forms the ba-
sis" of the claim. 135
Specifically, Maxine failed to allege "facts sufficient to establish the de-
cedent's high susceptibility to undue influence," the seventh element of undue
influence under Maryland law, either by alleging his medical or mental condi-
tion, the use of force or fear, or any facts supporting the claim of "coercion."
136
On this basis, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's dismissal of her
127 Id.
128 Id. at 727- 728.
129 Id. at 728.
130 Id.
131 Id.
132 Id. at 728-29.
133 Id.
134 Id.
135 Id. at 730.
136 Id. at 731-32. However, she did allege five or six of the seven elements of undue influ-
ence under Maryland law, namely, a confidential relationship between Francis and Meadow-
croft, a substantial benefit to Francis, Francis' involvement in the drafting of the will, an oppor-
tunity to exert influence, a change from a former will, and "possibly an unnatural disposition."
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case. 137
Geduldig v. Posner,'38 the second case, is factually more convoluted,
but the legal result is similar. Rose Posner was the wealthy widowed mother of
three adult children, David, Judith, and Carol. Between 1985 and 1996 she exe-
cuted at least ten separate wills and codicils, making a variety of contradictory
dispositions. When our story begins, Rose had been estranged from her daughter
Judith since 1975.139 Rose's 1985 will bequeathed just one hundred dollars to
Judith (and the same amount to each of Judith's surviving children), dividing the
residue of her sizeable estate between David and Carol. 140 Later that same year,
she executed a codicil purporting to exercise a power of appointment over mari-
tal trust assets created in her late husband's will, giving half to David and half to
Carol. 14 1 She also made inter vivos gifts of $750,000 each to David and Carol. 142
In 1990, she executed the first in a series of wills more and more favor-
able to David, and drafted by Mark Willen, David's long-time attorney.143 When
13' Anderson, 661 A.2d at 732 (Md. 1995). See also Geduldig v. Posner, 743 A.2d 247, 256
(Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1999).
138 743 A.2d 247.
139 Id. at 250-51, 254-55 ("There is evidence indicating ... that they spoke only once from
1975 to 1994.").
140 Id. at 249.
141 Id. As described below, it was later adjudicated that her husband's will did not give her a
testamentary power of appointment, and those assets were divided between the three children
equally. See infra note 142.
142 Id. In 1986, she executed a will which made the same disposition as the 1985 will and
codicil taken together. Id. at 249-50.
143 Id. at 250-51. The 1990 will gave one hundred dollars to Judith and each of her surviving
children, put $1 million in trust for David's children, and gave half the residuary estate to
David outright. The other half was placed in trust, with David as trustee. Carol would receive
the trust income for life, and David's children would receive the principal at Carol's death. Id.
at 250. Strictly speaking, the residuary estate went half to David, half to David as trustee for
Carol. During 1993-94, Rose's health began a serious decline. Id. After a family reconciliation
in 1994, engineered by Rose's brother, a physician, Rose executed the first of several wills
dividing the residue of her estate and the marital trust assets equally among all three children.
Id. at 250-51, 254-55. In April, 1994, she executed a codicil to the 1990 will, bequeathing the
residuary estate, including the marital trust assets, to the three children equally. Id. at 250-51.
Another "first codicil" to the 1990 will was prepared by Willen, although never executed,
which divided the assets into three equal shares but made a similar trust arrangement as the
1990 will. Id. at 251. On May 8, 1994, Rose executed a will, prepared by Willen, that revoked
the 1994 will and codicil, and republished the 1990 will. Id. at 251-52. On May 11, she exe-
cuted yet another will prepared by Willen, creating a $1 million trust fund for David's children,
appointing the marital trust assets to the children equally, and bequeathing the residuary estate
to the three children equally, but providing that if Judith or Carol predeceased Rose, their
shares would go to David's children in trust, with David as trustee. At this time the siblings
began litigating about whether Rose would remain in Devon Manor, the nursing home where
she had resided since February, 1994. Id. at 251-52. On May 12, Rose's physician-brother,
Judith, and Carol obtained a temporary restraining order (TRO) preventing David and his wife
from removing Rose from the nursing home. Id. On May 16, Rose executed a will disposing of
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she died in October, 1996, Rose left an estate worth in excess of six million dol-
lars. 144 Her last will, executed in January, 1996, and re-executed in March,
1996,145 set up a residuary trust with David as trustee.146 The bulk of her assets
went to the trust, which left $2.5 million to charity, $2.58 million to David and
his wife, one million dollars in trust for David's children, $100,000 to Rose's
sister, and one hundred dollars each to her daughters Judith and Carol.1 47 Per-
haps unsurprisingly, Judith and Carol sued. The sisters succeeded in having the
marital trust assets from their father's estate distributed in three equal shares, as
their father's will had provided.1 48 The sisters also filed a caveat petition, alleg-
ing that the 1996 will was the product of undue influence and fraud.149 The sis-
ters filed a separate suit against David (and his wife and children), alleging fraud
and undue influence, as well as an independent claims for tortious interference
with their expected inheritance (by means of fraud and undue influence), and
sought compensatory and punitive damages as well as a constructive trust over
the trust assets.' 50 In 1998, the cases were consolidated.' 5'
the estate to the three children equally. Id. at 252. This will (it almost goes without saying) was
not prepared by Willen. Id. Although an agreement was reached that Rose would not be moved
before June 3, on May 31 she was moved to Mercy Hospital, where David himself practiced as
a gastroenterologist. Id. at 252-53. On the same day, Rose executed a codicil prepared by Wil-
len, revoking the May 16 will, republishing the May 11 will, and altering it to the extent of
giving $250,000 to Daniel, one of Judith's children, but disinheriting the other grandchildren by
Judith. Id. at 253. On July 10, 1994, she executed yet another will prepared by Willen. Id. This
will bequeathed $20,000 to Rose's sister, $250,000 to Daniel, $1 million in trust for David's
children, and the residue to the three children, equally except Judith and Carol's shares were
reduced by $25,000 apiece. Id. The will recited that their shares were reduced because they had
attempted to have Rose declared incompetent. Id. The sisters denied having done any such
thing, and alleged that David made untrue statements to this effect to their mother. Id. at 253-
54. In 1994-95, family relations continued to deteriorate. David filed a complaint with the
Pennsylvania medical board against his uncle, relating to alleged over-medication of Rose. Id.
Rose accused Carol of being a "thief and a burglar" on the basis of statements made by David
to Rose. Id. Carol gave her mother a picture of Carol and her father, was hurt to find it had been
placed out of sight, and took it back. Rose, represented by Willen, sued Carol to recover it. Id.
at 254. The picture was returned and the suit was dismissed. In February, 1995, Rose executed
yet another will prepared by Willen, bequeathing $250,000 to Daniel, $1 million in trust for
David's children, appointing the marital trust assets to the three children equally, but giving the
residue to David. Id. at 253-54.
144 Id. at 248-49.
145 The execution and re-execution were also videotaped. Id. at 254-55.
146 Id. at 248-49.
147 Id.
148 Id. (citing Posner v. McDonagh, No. 1574, September Term, 1997 (filed March 11,
1999)). Specifically, the sisters successfully argued that their mother did not have a testamen-
tary power of appointment over the marital trust. The opinion does not indicate what portion of
the assets this covers.
149 Id. at 248-49.
150 Id. at 249.
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David moved for summary judgment on three bases: (1) there was no
evidence of undue influence and fraud because there was no evidence of force
or coercion, (2) tortious interference with expected inheritance is not recognized
as a tort in Maryland, and (3) there was no evidence of expectation of an inheri-
tance. 52 The trial court found that there was no evidence of undue influence,
because there was no evidence that Rose was susceptible to any influence or
false statement, nor was there any evidence that any fraudulent statements af-
fected the estate plan. 53 As a result, the trial court did not specifically reach the
viability of the tort claim.'- 4
The Maryland Court of Special Appeals reversed and remanded, finding
that "[t]he totality of the evidence, while largely circumstantial, is sufficient to
create a triable issue of fact" on the fraud and undue influence claims as these
relate to the admission of the 1996 will itself (the caveat petition).155 Although
the trial court had not addressed the tort claim, "for the benefit of the court on
remand," 56 the court addressed "whether Maryland recognizes the tort of inten-
tional interference with expected inheritance," and concluded "that the tort is not
available on the facts" of this case.
57
In its analysis, the Geduldig court gave painstaking attention to the issue
of remedies, in the context of the historical distinction between legal and equita-
ble actions. The court began by noting that the Restatement formulation of the
tort at § 774B does not specifically identify the damages recoverable, but refers
to § 774A, the damages section for the tort of interference with contract or pro-
spective economic relation. 58 Under § 774A, the plaintiff can recover conse-
quential damages, emotional distress or actual harm to reputation if it can rea-
sonably be expected to result from the interference, and, in appropriate circum-
stances, punitive damages. 59 In this respect, the tort is a typical action at law
like other torts.
The court then noted that "[t]raditionally, claims attacking the distribu-




154 Id. at 255. Neither the trial court nor the appellate court addressed whether the sisters had
pleaded an adequate expectancy, David's third basis for summary judgment. However, as they
are takers under a number of prior wills, as well as intestate heirs, it appears that in every juris-
diction that recognizes the tort at all, this element would be satisfied. See, e.g., Dulin v. Bailey,
90 S.E. 689 (N.C. 1916).
155 Geduldig, 743 A.2d at 259-60 (undue influence), 261 (fraud).
156 Id. at 248.
157 Id.
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actions,"' 6° for which pecuniary relief was available only when necessary to
give complete relief - for example, when assets had been dissipated. 16 1 Other-
wise, the equity court used "traditional equitable remedies such as rescission,
specific performance, injunctive relief, constructive trusts, and the like.' 162 Puni-
tive and compensatory damages (for emotional distress or harm to reputation)
are not available in equity. 63 The goal of an equitable action to set aside a will
or trust is to carry out the intent of the testator when it has been frustrated, not to
compensate a would-be beneficiary. 164
Although in many modem jurisdictions, the distinctions between tort
and contract, and between law and equity, have begun to fade away, Maryland
courts continue to hold the line. Just as a Maryland court refused to "preside
over the death of contract by recognizing as a tort a breach of contract that was
found to be in bad faith,"' 65 and refused to "preside over the death of equity" by
permitting a "generic cause of action at law for breach of fiduciary duty" (which
would make a jury trial available for a claim by beneficiaries against trustees,
traditionally an equitable action),166 the Geduldig court refused to, as it were,
"preside over the death of probate" by allowing an action at law, including puni-
tive damages, when a claim in probate or equity court that the will was procured
by undue influence or fraud will "afford complete, but traditional, relief' -
namely, the carrying out of the will of the testator. 167 Because the sisters'
"claims under the tort counts are duplicative of the independent [caveat] claims
based on fraud and undue influence," the court declined to recognize the tort.
After Geduldig, it does seem that a proper case might win the Maryland
court's approval. For example, under the facts of Bohannon, where the tort
plaintiff was neither an intestate heir nor a beneficiary under a prior instrument
(or if there were no will at all), a traditional caveat proceeding (will contest)
would not provide relief, even considered from the decedent's point of view, as
Geduldig directs. 68 In addition, if the assets have been dissipated or passed into
the hands of someone other than the tortfeasor, a constructive trust remedy may
not be available or appropriate. 169 Another situation favorable to recognition of
160 id.




165 Geduldig, 743 A.2d at 257 (quoting K&K Mgmt., Inc. v. Lee, 557 A.2d 965, 980-81 (Md.
1989)).
166 Id. at 256-57 (quoting Kann v. Kann, 690 A.2d 509 (Md. 1997)).
167 Geduldig, 743 A.2d at 257-58.
168 Id.
169 Many courts will not impose a constructive trust on an "innocent" party.
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the tort might arise if evidence of the tortious conduct is not discovered until
long after the close of probate, by which time the estate assets have been dis-
tributed and possibly consumed. In these situations, it appears that the Maryland
court might acknowledge the usefulness and necessity of the legal tort remedy.
In both Anderson and Geduldig, caveat proceedings were filed, so it is
not clear whether the Maryland court would allow a plaintiff to dispense with
this step.' 70 The crucial question appears to be whether a will contest would pro-
vide an adequate remedy; if so, a caveat proceeding would not be a prerequisite
to the tort suit, but a necessary substitute for it.
B. South Carolina
As of 1999, "South Carolina has apparently never recognized a claim
for interference with inheritance rights," and the unusual and unhappy facts of
Douglass v. Boyce did not persuade the Court of Appeals of South Carolina to
take this step.1 71 On appeal, the South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed, stating:
"We have not adopted the tort of intentional interference with inheritance, how-
ever, we need not decide whether to recognize this cause of action here.'
172
Douglass does not present the familiar pattern of resentful children fighting their
young stepmother or feuding siblings at war. Frankly, the facts sound more like
a TV "movie of the week" set in a small Southern town. William, the child
plaintiff is the son of the former Melodye Shampine, a teacher's aide married to
Robert Douglass.1 73 Christopher Boyce, the boy's alleged biological father, was
a teenaged "special needs" student in Melodye's class who was killed in a car
accident while William was still a baby. 174 During Melodye's pregnancy, but
before William's birth, Robert sued for divorce, on the grounds of adultery.f
75
However, the child's paternity was never adjudicated, and under state law, his
legitimacy as Robert's child was established conclusively. 76 Boyce's family
170 Anderson v. Meadowcroft, 661 A.2d at 726-27. The caveat proceeding was filed by the
decedent's three brothers, and later dismissed. The plaintiff in the tort case was not a party to
caveat proceeding. Id. at 727.
171 Douglass v. Boyce, 519 S.E.2d 802, aff'd, 542 S.E.2d 715 (S.C. 2001). In the early case
of Bemis v. Waters, 170 S.E. 475 (S.C. 1933), the Supreme Court of South Carolina declined to
recognize a cause of action for damages based on an inter vivos conveyance of real estate, al-
legedly procured by the donee's undue influence, in deprivation of the right of the donee's
siblings to inherit that real estate. Id. at 477. The analysis turned on whether the cause of action
survived the death of the testator. Id. at 476-77.
172 Douglass, 542 S.E.2d at 715, 717.
173 Id. at 804.
174 Id.
175 Id.
176 Id. at 805. South Carolina, like most states, has a strong though rebuttable presumption
that a child born to a married woman is the child of her husband, unless a paternity action
proves otherwise. Id. at 805 (citing Lewter v. Thompson, 315 S.E.2d 821 (S.C. Ct. App. 1984)).
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brought a wrongful death suit based on the car accident, but William was not
named as a beneficiary and he did not receive any part of the settlement. 7 7 In
Douglass, William's lawyer, on William's behalf, sued the attorneys who repre-
sented Boyce's estate in the wrongful death suit.
78
William argued that these attorneys intentionally interfered with his in-
heritance rights from Boyce by failing to include him as a beneficiary. 179 The
trial court held that William had failed to state a claim, and the appellate court
affirmed, holding,
Even if such a claim [intentional interference with inheritance
rights] were cognizable, it also fails... because there is no al-
legation that these attorneys were acting for their own personal
benefit outside the scope of their representation, or that they had
any independent duty to William. William cannot claim that
[the attorney defendants] interfered with his inheritance rights
by not disregarding his legitimacy and thus stigmatizing him as
the illegitimate child of Christopher Boyce.
1 80
William's claim failed, and the recognition of the tort in South Carolina must
await another day (and perhaps a more sympathetic set of facts).' 8'
C. Virginia
As of the year 2000, the state of Virginia does not recognize a cause of
action for tortious interference with inheritance. The disputants in Economopou-
los v. Kolaitis182 present a familiar pattern: the testator's three daughters against
their only brother, a long-time business associate of their father's. In 1990, the
father had purchased three $200,000 Treasury bills, each titled jointly with a
daughter. 83 In a 1994 codicil to his 1992 will, the father directed the son, as
executor, to divide $600,000 of the Treasury bill funds into three shares and pay
177 Douglass, 519 S.E.2d at 804.
178 id. He also sued the divorce attorneys on both sides; these claims were also dismissed.
Id. at 805.
179 Id. at 806-07.
1o Id. at 807.
181 In essence, it appears that William's claim failed because he sued the wrong defendants.
The Boyce estate's wrongful death attorneys neither knew, had reason to know, or had a duty to
find out, that William might be his heir. In fact, the only people who arguably interfered with
his inheritance rights from Boyce were William's mother Melodye and her husband Robert,
neither of whom sought to have William's paternity adjudicated while Boyce was still alive. It
was their failure to act that prevented him from inheriting.
182 528 S.E.2d 714 (Va. 2000).
183 See id.at 717.
[Vol. 104
34
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 104, Iss. 2 [2002], Art. 4
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol104/iss2/4
REVENGE OF THE DISAPPOINTED HEIR
these shares to each daughter.' 84 However, in the spring of 1996, the father de-
cided to redeem the T-bills, giving $160,000 of the funds to the son and placing
another $140,000 into bank accounts that went to son at the father's death. After
this took place, the father executed another will in 1996, dividing his residuary
estate equally among all four children, and this will was admitted to probate
after his death in 1997.185
The case went to trial in Virginia, but after the close of the daughters'
case-in-chief, "the trial court struck the [daughters'] evidence as to all counts
and entered judgment in favor of the [son] .'186 The Virginia Supreme Court
affirmed the trial court's dismissal of the tortious interference claim. The court
stated further,
A person who is mentally competent and not subject to undue
influence may make any disposition of his property he chooses
during his lifetime or by will at his death. Moreover, the
[daughters] had only an expectancy in the Treasury bills while
[their father] was alive and in control of them.'
87
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court's brief analysis provides little guid-
ance as to whether the court might recognize a claim with better evidence of
tortious conduct, or one where the interference was with the testamentary dispo-
sition itself, rather than inter vivos conveyances. Here, it appears that the daugh-
ters were not able to prove that the 1996 will was procured by undue influence,
or that undue influence was used to deplete the estate in favor of the son through
an inter vivos transfer, either of which could support this cause of action in some
other states.
188
V. CHOICE OF FORUM AND THE "PROBATE EXCEPTION"
Currently, the only reported cases in the five states of the Fourth Circuit
addressing tortious interference with expectation of inheritance have been liti-
gated in state court, and the federal jurisdictional issues have therefore not yet
been explicitly addressed. Ordinarily, tort claims between diverse parties that
also satisfy the statutory amount in controversy may be litigated in either state
or federal court.
89




187 See id. at 720.
i8 For example, under West Virginia law as set out in Calacino, supra, if the daughters'
challenge to the inter vivos transfers was timely, it appears that the action could be maintained.
189 See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (West 2001).
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not every case that apparently meets these requirements can in fact be heard in
federal court. One of the most significant of these exceptions covers probate
matters. Under the so-called "probate exception," a federal court may not "pro-
bate a will or administer an estate."' 90 The question is whether tortious interfer-
ence with expectation of inheritance is so closely related to the probate of a will
that it is covered by the probate exception, so that federal jurisdiction is lacking,
or falls outside it, permitting diversity jurisdiction in a proper case.1 9'
In general, to the extent that the courts of a state recognize the need for
the tort, and rely on the inadequacy of the probate court to remedy the injury in
question, the federal courts of that state will be likely not to apply the probate
exception. Nevertheless, the analyses are not identical, and it is possible in prin-
ciple for a state to recognize the tort and yet find that federal diversity jurisdic-
tion over it does not exist, relegating the parties exclusively to state court. In
addition, the federal courts in a number of states that have not yet recognized the
tort have decisional law on the probate exception, which can provide guidance
about federal jurisdiction over the tort should it be recognized.
With a proper understanding of the scope of the probate exception in the
Fourth Circuit, it is possible to discern the likely results, particularly in North
Carolina and West Virginia, the two states that recognize the tort. Naturally, it is
more difficult to predict how this issue would be resolved in the states that do
not (yet) recognize the tort. However, federal district court probate exception
cases from Maryland, South Carolina, and Virginia do provide some guidance.
Some brief background on the probate exception is in order. The his-
torical roots of the probate exception are found in the initial grant of jurisdiction
to the federal courts of the United States in the Judiciary Act of 1798. In Eng-
land at that time, there existed a tripartite judicial system: courts of law, chan-
cery (equity) courts, and Ecclesiastical (Church) courts. Simplifying greatly,
courts of law had jurisdiction over actions for damages, and held jury trials;
chancery courts granted specific and injunctive remedies, and had jurisdiction
over trusts; and Ecclesiastical courts had the exclusive power to probate wills
and administer estates. 92 At the end of the eighteenth century, the federal dis-
trict courts of the United States were given original jurisdiction over "all suits of
a civil nature at common law or in equity."' 193 Whether intentionally or by over-
190 See Markham v. Allen, 326 U.S. 490, 494 (1946).
191 In addition, in some situations in which the federal court has jurisdiction, it nevertheless
may elect to abstain from exercising that jurisdiction. Because the cases of tortious interference
in the states of the Fourth Circuit are all state cases, speculation about application of the various
federal abstention doctrines is even more difficult than the jurisdictional issue, and will not be
addressed in this Article.
192 Ecclesiastical courts also had exclusive jurisdiction over marriage and marital status,
legitimacy, adoption, and other "domestic" matters. See generally Sharon Rush, Domestic Rela-
tions Law: Federal Jurisdiction and State Sovereignty in Perspective, 60 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1, 12-15 (1984).
193 Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20 § 11, 1 Stat. 73.
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sight, suits that would be heard by English Ecclesiastical courts were omitted.'
94
In a sense, the "probate exception" is a misnomer; jurisdiction over probate is
something the federal courts arguably never had at all.
The leading twentieth-century United States Supreme Court case reaf-
firming and clarifying the probate exception is Markham v. Allen,'95 in which
the Court held that
although a federal court may not probate a will or administer an
estate, it may entertain suits in favor of creditors, legatees, heirs
and other claimants against a decedent's estate to establish their
claims so long as the federal court does not interfere with the
probate proceedings or assume general jurisdiction of the pro-
bate or control of the property in the custody of the state
court. 1
96
Of course, many other claims also stand in some relation to probate or estate
administration, including claims against third parties such as tortious interfer-
ence, and often it is not easy to tell whether a particular claim falls on one side
or the other of the Markham divide.
Fortunately, the Fourth Circuit has a well-developed jurisprudence in
this area. 197 The leading post-Markham Fourth Circuit case, Foster v. Carlin,
198
held that
194 Some commentators are deeply critical of the probate exception, describing it as "arising
out of obscure historical distinctions," "an artificial interpretation of the Act, in the context of
its English legal antecedents." Gregory Luke & Daniel Hoffheimer, Federal Probate Jurisdic-
tion: Examining The Exception To The Rule, 39 FED. B. NEWS & J. 579 (Nov./Dec. 1992).
Nevertheless, even the critics acknowledge that "The probate exception is alive and well in all
circuits; it survives with Supreme Court support." Id.
195 326 U.S. 490 (1946).
196 Id. at 494.
197 Two pre-Markham cases similarly recognized the exception. See Cottingham v. Hall, 55
F.2d 664, 665 (4th Cir. 1932) ("[F]ederal courts have no jurisdiction in matters of probate ad-
ministration ... while federal courts may not take jurisdiction in cases involving the probate of
a will or cases attempting to disturb the possession of an estate properly in the hands of a state
probate court or involving the conclusiveness of judgments of state courts in such matters, yet
where, as here, the suit is simply a suit by distributees seeking to establish their right to their
shares, and enforce such rights against a fiduciary and his surety, a federal court has jurisdic-
tion.") (finding that federal jurisdiction exists to enforce a trust against a fiduciary where the
administration of the estate had been completed); Ladd v. Tallman, 59 F.2d 732 (4th Cir. 1932)
("It has been repeatedly held, and we know of no decision to the contrary, that federal courts
may not take jurisdiction in cases involving the probate of a will or cases attempting to disturb
the possession of an estate properly in the hands of a state probate court or involving the con-
clusiveness of judgments of state courts in such matters.") (applying the exception). It should
be noted that the Cottingham court specifically found jurisdiction on the "equity," rather than
the "law," side of the federal court, on analogy to the English Chancery court's jurisdiction
over trust administration. Cottingham, 55 F.2d at 665-66.
198 200 F.2d 943 (4th Cir. 1952).
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[t]he law is well settled that the federal courts have no jurisdic-
tion over matters within the exclusive jurisdiction of state pro-
bate courts. However, as to matters which do not involve ad-
ministration of an estate or the probate of a will, but which may
be determined in a separate action inter partes in the courts of
general jurisdiction of the state, the federal courts do have juris-
diction if the requisite diversity of citizenship exists.199
Hence, under Foster, the crucial determination is whether the claim is one
within the probate court's exclusive jurisdiction (in which case there is no fed-
eral jurisdiction), or instead could be brought in a state court of general jurisdic-
tion in the state where the federal court sits (in which case federal diversity ju-
risdiction may exist in a proper case).2°
Foster has been relied on as the definitive application of Markham by
district courts in all the states of the Fourth Circuit,201 and has been referred to
with approval by the Fourth Circuit itself as recently as 1999.202 Notice that Fos-
ter's strict reliance on the precise jurisdictional limits of the probate court of
each particular state precludes the development of a completely uniform probate
exception across the Circuit. Nevertheless, Foster assures uniformity in the
method used to determine whether a particular claim falls under the probate ex-
ception or not - namely, a determination of whether the claim is within the ex-
clusive jurisdiction of the state probate court. If not, and particularly if the claim
is outside the probate court's jurisdiction, the probate exception will not apply,
and federal diversity jurisdiction may exist.
Now we are in a position to undertake an examination of the parameters
of the probate exception in each of the states of the Fourth Circuit. First, we will
examine the states that recognize the tort, and then turn to those that do not.
There are reported cases from federal district courts in North Carolina
both applying and declining to apply the probate exception. In Sisson v. Camp-
bell University, Inc. ,203 the Federal District Court for the Eastern District of
North Carolina found that it had jurisdiction over a claim by an executrix of an
estate against a trust beneficiary for breach of trust, breach of fiduciary duty,
199 Id. at 947.
200 See id.
201 See Oliver v. Oliver, No. 98-1460, 1999 WL 308594, at *1 (4th Cir. May 17, 1999)
(affirming judgment of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Caro-
lina); Jones v. Harper, 55 F. Supp. 2d 530, 532 (S.D.W. Va. 1999); Law v. Law, 922 F. Supp.
1106, 1109 (E.D. Va. 1996); Beattie v. J. M. Tull Found., 941 F. Supp. 57, 58 (D.S.C. 1996);
Hershon v. Cannon, No. Civ. A. HAR 92-3053, 1993 WL 19660, at *2 (D. Md. Jan. 21, 1993)
(mem.); Akrotirianakis v. Burroughs, 262 F. Supp. 918, 921 (D. Md. 1967) ("The rule in this
Circuit was authoritatively stated in Foster v. Carlin.").
202 See Oliver v. Oliver, No. 98-1460, 1999 WL 308594, at *1 (4th Cir. May 17, 1999).
203 688 F. Supp. 1064 (E.D.N.C. 1988).
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and conversion.204 The federal court found that it had jurisdiction notwithstand-
ing that it lacked power to grant some of the relief requested, 205 and that probate
and related proceedings were still pending in state court.206 That the case con-
cerned a trust, traditionally within the equity jurisdiction of the court, supports
this result, but potentially limits its applicability in the tort context. However,
the court also supported its finding of jurisdiction with the observation that the
claim is one in personam, not in rem (like a probate proceeding) or quasi in
rem,20 7 a distinction which would also apply to the tort claim.
In Oliver v. Oliver,20 8 the Fourth Circuit affirmed the Eastern District of
North Carolina's dismissal of a case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under
the probate exception. The case was a declaratory judgment action seeking to
describe "the rights, duties, and obligation of the parties under [a] will, a codicil,
and [a] note," directing the executor "to abstain from making certain decisions
or taking certain actions in the administration of the estate and to provide spe-
cific information concerning the estate; [and] deciding certain questions con-
cerning the administration of the estate. ' '209 Applying the method of Foster, the
Fourth Circuit found that North Carolina law gives the clerk of the superior
court exclusive jurisdiction over the probate of wills and the administration of
estates; that the claims raised could have been brought at the hearing to close the
estate; and that the relief requested would be an impermissible interference with
the administration of the estate.2 Notice that in this case, the court did not dis-
tinguish between remedies within and those outside the federal court's jurisdic-
tion; because "all" the claims fall within probate jurisdiction, federal jurisdiction
is lacking.21' In Dulin, the North Carolina Supreme Court concluded its opinion
by stating, "As the action is not to set up the will, nor against the estate, but
against the defendants individually for their tort, the action could be brought in
the county where the plaintiff resides [rather than where the will must be pro-
bated, the decedent's county of residence at death]. 212 This procedural remark
suggests, albeit indirectly, that the tort claim is not within the exclusive jurisdic-
tion of the probate court, because it can be filed elsewhere, and that diversity
jurisdiction would be proper under Foster.
Similarly, although no West Virginia federal court has yet ruled on the
204 See id. at 1065, 1069.
205 See id. at 1068.
206 See id. at 1066-67.
207 See id. at 1067.
208 No. 98-1460, 1999 WL 308594 (4th Cir. May 17, 1999).
209 See id. at * 1.
210 See id.
211 See id.
212 Dulin v. Bailey, 90 S.E. at 690 (N.C. 1916).
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jurisdictional issue in the tort context, the reasoning in Barone strongly suggests
that diversity jurisdiction exists and the probate exception does not apply. The
West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals specifically rejected the trial court's
position that the tort suit is a collateral attack on the probated will, and held that
the tort "is not within probate court jurisdiction. 2 3 Based on a similar conclu-
sion reached by an Illinois state court, the Seventh Circuit found that this cause
of action was therefore not "ancillary to probate" and not covered by the probate
exception.214 This suggests that West Virginia would reach the same result.
West Virginia has only a single case applying the probate exception, decided in
1999. In Jones v. Harper,215 the district court dismissed a father's suit against
his deceased daughter's husband, seeking to remove the son-in-law as personal
representative and appoint the father, while the estate was still open.216 The
court's rationale was that "the removal and appointment of a personal represen-
tative clearly would interfere with the administration of the estate," and that "the
probate exception prevents this federal Court from interfering with an open state
probate proceeding., 21 7 The court noted that had the estate been closed, and had
the father sought appointment solely for the purpose of prosecuting a wrongful
death claim, the result might have been different.218 Jones suggests that in West
Virginia, the probate exception would not bar the tort, at least after the close of
probate. Because Barone does not impose an exhaustion requirement, it appears
that a tort plaintiff would not jeopardize his claim by awaiting the close of pro-
bate before filing in federal court.
As noted above, among states of the Fourth Circuit not recognizing the
tort, Maryland appears closest to doing so. Although there are three Maryland
probate exception cases, they are all in the trust area, traditionally covered by
equity jurisdiction, and thus perhaps not analogous to the tort context. In Ak-
rotirianakis v. Burroughs,219 the Maryland district court endorsed Foster, and
declined to apply the probate exception to an action for rescission of a sale of
realty to a trustee at a below-market price, in breach of fiduciary obligations.22 °
Specifically, the court reasoned that rescission of the sale is a remedy outside
the jurisdiction of the probate court (called in Maryland the "Orphans' Court"),
and exclusively within equity jurisdiction. 22 Following Foster, the court noted
213 Barone v. Barone, 294 S.E.2d 260 (W. Va. 1982).
214 Georges v. Glick, 856 F.2d 971, 974-75 (7th Cir. 1988).
215 55 F. Supp. 2d 530 (S.D.W. Va. 1999).
216 See id. at 532.
217 Id. at 533.
218 See id. at 534, n.2.
219 262 F. Supp. 918 (D. Md. 1967).
220 See id. at 923.
221 See id. at 922.
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that if the claim were brought in a county court of general jurisdiction, "no rea-
sonable objection to its jurisdiction could be raised," and therefore, federal ju-
22223
risdiction was proper. In Hershon v. Cannon,223 the court similarly declined to
apply the probate exception to a suit by buyers of real property against the per-
sonal representative of the estate that owned the property.224 The remedy sought
was again outside the jurisdiction of the Maryland probate court, because under
Maryland law, only an equity court of general jurisdiction can determine title to
real property.225 The court also noted that this federal suit would not interfere
with the administration of the estate.226 Finally, in Conboy v. Norwest Bank
Indiana, N.A.,227 the Maryland district court applied the exception to bar the
claim of an apparently disappointed heir against the bank serving as personal
representative and trustee of the estate of his relative.228 Although these cases
are in the trust area, to the extent that the tort makes punitive damages and attor-
ney's fees available, as it typically does, a tort claim seeks a form of relief be-
yond the jurisdiction of the probate court, and this remedy-oriented approach
therefore seems favorable to conferral of federal jurisdiction in the event that the
tort is recognized.
South Carolina currently does not recognize the tort. In addition, only
one South Carolina federal district court case has addressed the probate excep-
tion. In Beattie v. J.M. Tull Foundation,229 the South Carolina district court de-
clined to apply the probate exception to a declaratory judgment action regarding
trust administration, including some elements of estate administration, for a
closed estate. 230 Following Foster and the pre-Markham Fourth Circuit cases of
Cottingham and Ladd, the district court first looked to whether the action could
be maintained in a state court of general jurisdiction, and found that it could
be.23 ' Interestingly, although under South Carolina law the probate court has
exclusive jurisdiction over a claim of this type, the claim is removable to a court
of general jurisdiction, and that was considered good enough to support federal
jurisdiction.232 In addition, as the court said, "Presumably, after thirty years, the
222 Id.
223 No. Civ. A. HAR 92-3053, 1993 WL 19660 (D. Md. Jan. 21, 1993) (mem.).
224 See id. at *2-*3.
225 See id. at *3.
226 See id.
227 No. Civ. S 94-1851, 1994 WL 621605 (D. Md. July 13, 1994) (mem.).
228 See id. at *1. The opinion is extremely terse; this conclusion is based only on the fact that
the plaintiff and the decedent share the last name "Conboy."
229 941 F. Supp. 57 (D.S.C. 1996).
230 See id. at 59.
231 See id. at 58.
232 See id. at 59.
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estate has already been distributed and closed," and therefore, requiring the
court to construe the terms of the testamentary trust will not disturb that proc-
ess. 23 3 Although this is a trust case, the court did not look to the circuit court's
equity jurisdiction in its reasoning. On this basis, if the South Carolina state
courts were to recognize the tort as an independent action at law for damages, it
appears that the rationale of Beattie would support federal jurisdiction over the
claim.
Finally, although the state of Virginia also does not recognize the tort,
the Virginia probate exception cases indicate that the exception is applied nar-
rowly, and that the presence of prayers for relief that fall outside federal juris-
diction does not disqualify cases from being heard in federal court there. The
leading Fourth Circuit probate exception case, Foster v. Carlin,234 came out of
Virginia, and the opinion therefore provides not only methodological but sub-
stantive guidance as to the scope of the probate exception in Virginia. In Foster,
the Fourth Circuit held that an action to pass on the validity of a settlement
agreement, entered into by heirs of the decedent, fell outside the probate excep-
tion.235 Crucial to this result was a finding that the Virginia court was without
jurisdiction to make this determination, and a separate action in equity would be
needed to do SO.236 Hence, federal jurisdiction existed, even though one of the
forms of relief requested, a declaration that the decedent died intestate, was out-
side federal jurisdiction.237 In the recent case of Law v. Law,238 the Eastern Dis-
trict of the Federal District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia found that
the probate exception did not bar the suit of a widow against her late husband's
father for breach of a contract relating to payment of estate expenses. 239 After a
careful review of Ladd, Cottingham, Foster, and Sisson, the district court con-
cluded that an action to determine "whether the alleged contract was made, and
if so, what funeral expenses and other debts existed at the time of decedent's
death.., would have no impact on the administration of the probate estate, and
therefore federal subject matter jurisdiction exists for the contract claim. ''24°
Again, as in Foster, one form of relief sought was held to be outside federal
jurisdiction, but this did not affect the central question of the application of the
probate exception. 24' Hence, in Virginia, it appears that should the tort be recog-
233 See id.
234 200 F.2d 943 (4th Cir. 1952).
235 See Foster, 200 F.2d at 951.
236 See id. at 950.
237 See id.
238 922 F. Supp. 1106 (E.D. Va. 1996).
239 Seeid. at 1111.
240 Id.
241 See id. at 11 11, n.9. The extra-jurisdictional remedy sought here was that defendant
specifically perform the contract by distributing the estate in a particular way. Id.
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nized, the probate exception would not exclude such cases from federal court.
As a breach of contract case, the aptly-named Law opens the door of federal
court a bit wider than some of the probate exception cases that explicitly rely on
federal equitable jurisdiction to allow certain claims into federal court.
VI. CONCLUSION
With respect to the tort of intentional interference with expectation of
inheritance, the states of the Fourth Circuit are a microcosm of the country as a
whole. Each has chosen to balance the claims of injured plaintiffs and the
boundaries of the probate system in its own way. Virginia and West Virginia are
at opposite ends of the spectrum: Virginia refuses to recognize the tort at all,
while West Virginia apparently gives the disappointed heir an election of reme-
dies in either probate court or a tort action at law. North Carolina, one of the
first states in the U.S. to validate the tort, takes what can be considered the
mainstream view among states that recognize it; namely, that the tort is avail-
able only to those plaintiffs who cannot receive an adequate remedy from the
probate court. Although it has not happened yet, it appears that there is nothing
preventing the tort claim from being brought in federal court under diversity in
either of the states that recognize it. In their stance towards the tort, South Caro-
lina and Maryland fall somewhere between North Carolina and Virginia. In nei-
ther state has a plaintiff appeared with a claim the court is ready to recognize,
yet a certain sympathy for the action itself can be detected, particularly in Mary-
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